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ABSTRACT 
Law enforcement agencies have managed anonymous tip line programs for 
decades whereby community members can submit suspected criminal activity to 
their local law enforcement agency. As a result of the increasing threat of 
terrorism in the United States, suspicious activity reporting programs (SAR) 
accompany the traditional anonymous tip line. SARs include the reporting of 
suspicious behavior related to terrorism, as well as other criminal activity. 
SAR programs have been adopted by federal, state and local jurisdictions 
and at state and regional fusion centers. Homeland security is a shared 
responsibility of the American public and SAR programs are a mechanism that 
allows the public to contribute to this country’s security. 
Smaller law enforcement agencies in the United States lack the resources 
of larger police departments. The research set out to determine if smaller police 
agencies lacked SAR programs, which thus might create a gap in U.S. overall 
homeland security, An audit of 355 California police department websites that 
serve populations from 10,000 to over one million revealed that 5.9% of the 
agencies supported an online SAR program. To verify the audit, 117 of the police 
departments were contacted and three of the agencies or 2.6% supported a SAR 
program accessible by the public either by a direct phone line or by some other 
means.  
The thesis presents research to identify best practices for establishing 
SAR programs in police departments. The research explores national strategy 
documents, privacy and civil liberties guidelines and national SAR standards. 





The research concludes with a list of action items agencies should 
consider when implementing a SAR program. Successful SAR programs rely on 
the timely analysis of information and sharing intelligence through shared 
networks. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
In the 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security, homeland security is 
referred to as a shared responsibility between the government and the citizenry. 
The document states that to complete a truly national effort, it is essential to 
encourage and draw upon an informed and active citizenry (p. 4). The report 
specifically states that citizens should know what to do if they observe suspicious 
behavior in their community. 
In the United States, numerous SARs are implemented at the local, state 
and federal level. SARs are the mechanisms employed by federal, state, and 
local level agencies for the public to report suspicious activity related to terrorism 
or other criminal behavior Most of the programs are similar in reporting 
processes, assessment systems and information dissemination to the public. 
Often, the public accesses a department website and completes documentation 
of the observed suspicious criminal or terrorist’s activity. Those who submit a 
SAR are normally required to provide identifying information. A staff member 
from the agency reviews the information and analyzes it according to agency 
policy.  
The United States has approximately 800,000 local, state and federal law 
enforcement officers and 1.1 million firefighters (VFD Resources, Inc., n.d.). 
These 1.9 million first responders are tasked with the protection of life and 
property and respond to millions of calls for service each year. According to the 
U.S. Census Bureau, over 308 million residents live in the United States (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2010). Leveraging the entire population of the United States in 
homeland security efforts can assist in the ability to prevent future terrorist acts in 
the United States. 
According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, as of September 2007, 
12,575 police departments existed in the United States, which do not include 
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sheriff departments. Approximately 75% of those police agencies serve a 
population less than 10,000 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, n.d.). Smaller 
departments lack the resources to staff fulltime employees for homeland security 
functions. Conversely, some large municipal law enforcement agencies have 
robust homeland security programs that include fusion centers, fulltime staff, and 
funding. SAR programs are monitored and information processed, verified, and 
when appropriate, acted upon.  
Suspicious criminal and terrorist activity can occur in any town or city in 
the United States. Germain Difo authored a report in May 2010 that analyzed 32 
terrorist plots that have been foiled since 9/11. Citizen vigilance played a role in 
thwarting an attack in approximately 21% of the cases examined (Difo, 2010). 
Difo identified two attacks thwarted by direct civilian intervention and five by 
civilian provided intelligence. 
On the other hand, some suspicious incidents have gone unreported, 
which has resulted in the loss of lives. In preparation for the 9/11 attacks, two of 
the hijackers, Nawaf al Hazmi and Khalid al Mihdhar, came to the United States 
to learn English and take flying lessons. They consulted with a pilot from the 
Sorbi Flying Club in San Diego. The attackers wanted to enroll immediately in jet 
training. The attackers were focused on learning to control an aircraft in flight and 
expressed no interest in take offs and landings (National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks, 2004). The suspicious activity was not reported. 
In another example, Author Loch Johnson in the book Intelligence and 
National Security writes that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) failed to 
respond to warnings from its own agents in Phoenix and Minneapolis about 
suspicious flight training undertaken by foreigners in those cities (Johnson, 2012, 
p. 500). Zacarias Moussaoui engaged in flight training in Norman, Oklahoma and 
Eagan, Minnesota that raised some suspicion. The Immigration and 




August 16, 2001. The FBI did not connect Moussaoui to al Qaeda or a possible 
threat involving piloted airliners (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004, 
p. 273). 
Most law enforcement agencies across the country do not have a SAR 
system. For example, of the 21 law enforcement agencies in San Mateo County, 
California, only one agency has a system for citizens to enter suspicious activity 
on the agency’s website, and four agencies advertise an anonymous tip line via a 
phone number. Thirteen of the agencies have decidedly fewer resources with a 
population of 35,000 or less. It appears a gap exists in SAR systems 
implemented by smaller law enforcement agencies. The gap could be a large 
hole in the country’s overall homeland security.  
B.  BACKGROUND  
Municipal law enforcement departments across the United States use a 
variety of phrases and words to communicate their organizational mission to their 
staff and communities. Very often, you will find terms such as, community 
policing, collaboration, community engagement, working closely with the 
community, the prevention of crime, community partnerships, etc. In essence, 
law enforcement organizations are expressing to the public the need to work 
collaboratively together to prevent crime, protect life and property and to create a 
sense of a safe community. The law enforcement profession recognizes the 
important role and responsibility that the public plays to achieve its desired 
outcome. Anonymous tip lines have long served as a mechanism for the public to 
inform law enforcement agencies of criminal behavior or suspected criminal 
behavior. Since 9/11, anonymous tip lines have been enhanced to include SRA 
related to terrorism. 
The country’s national homeland security strategy documents specifically 
recognize the public’s role in ensuring a safe homeland. Federal, state and local 
law enforcement have adopted SAR as a strategy to prevent terrorism. However, 
SAR is less prevalent in smaller organizations than larger police agencies for 
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many possible reasons including budget restrictions, indifference, knowledge 
gaps, or other higher priority concerns. Regardless of the obstacle for law 
enforcement, the country is not taking advantage of its entire human intelligence 
to prevent acts of terrorism. 
The Nationwide SAR Initiative (NSI) was mandated to establish a unified 
process for reporting, tracking and accessing SARs in a manner that protects 
civil liberties as directed by the National Strategy for Information Sharing. The 
NSI strategy included the development of a common method to collect, 
document, process, analyze, and share SAR intelligence. This effort may be a 
mechanism for law enforcement agencies across the country to implement a 
SAR program given the limited resources many agencies encounter.  
C.  RESEARCH QUESTION  
Does a gap exist in SAR programs implemented by smaller law 
enforcement jurisdictions? If so, what are the components of a model SAR 
program that can be implemented and replicated in smaller law enforcement 
jurisdictions in the United States? What role can fusion centers or joint terrorism 
task forces play in the development of SAR programs at smaller law enforcement 
jurisdictions? To answer the questions, this thesis examines national strategy 
SAR documents, and specifically, recommendations from the NSI Reporting 
Initiative. A comparative analysis of current SAR programs implemented in the 
United States, United Kingdom and Israel is examined. Fusion centers and joint 
terrorism task forces are analyzed to determine their role in SAR and the 
resources available to support or initiate SAR programs in smaller law 
enforcement jurisdictions. Lastly, audits were conducted and analyzed of 
California police department websites for the existence of SARs, anonymous tip 
line programs and other terrorism-related information. The audits were 
categorized in the following population classes consistent with the Uniform Crime 
Reporting Statistics for the U.S. Department of Justice, FBI (U.S. Department of 
Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2010). 
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• 10,000 to 24,999 
• 25,000 to 49,999 
• 50,000 to 99,000 
• 100,000 to 249,000 
• 250,000 to 499,000 
• 500.000 to 999,000 
• Over one million 
D.  SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH  
The research serves as a resource for smaller law enforcement agencies 
to adopt and implement SAR programs, as well as a document to support the 
importance of SAR programs in the country’s homeland security efforts. 
Agencies learn the important role the public has in protecting this homeland. The 
Metropolitan’s Transit Authority’s “If You See Something, Say Program” might 
serve as a model community outreach program that can be replicated.  
The research highlights the importance of the relationship between the 
local fusion center and police department. The reader learns about the available 
resources through fusion center partners and also understands the local law 
enforcement’s responsibility in meeting U.S. National Strategy for Homeland 
Security goals when relating to public awareness and public participation in the 
area of sharing suspicious information. The research provides law enforcement 
agencies that cannot staff fulltime personnel to a SAR program a model on how 
to implement a SAR that can gather, document, process, analyze and share 
information in a timely manner. Lastly, the research identified a gap in SAR 
programs hosted by California law enforcement agencies. 
E. HYPOTHESIS 
This thesis hypothesizes that a gap exists in SAR programs in smaller law 
enforcement agencies in the United States. As a result, the United States is not 
meeting the goals of the national homeland security strategies that homeland 
security is a shared responsibility between the citizenry and the government. The 
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thesis assumes that local municipal law enforcement is a key component in the 
nation’s homeland security. The thesis also assumes that law enforcement 
personnel and citizens have the best opportunity to recognize suspicious activity 
and report the activity to the appropriate authority. 
This thesis hypothesizes that existing SAR programs operational in this 
country and in foreign countries can serve as models for other law enforcement 
agencies to replicate. International terrorism has a longer history than American 
terrorism. The United Kingdom and Israel have already experienced the stage of 
the current U.S. terrorism environment. The lessons learned from the United 
Kingdom and Israel’s community outreach to terrorism are valuable. Both these 
countries are U.S. allies. 
This thesis hypothesizes that the 73 fusion centers throughout the United 
States as of April 2011 have resources available to local law enforcement to 
initiate SAR programs and to train personnel in SAR and intelligence analysis 
functions (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2012). According to the 
Department of Homeland Security website, fusion centers serve as focal points 
within the state and local environment for the receipt, analysis, gathering, and 
sharing of threat-related information between the federal government and state, 
local, tribal, territorial (SLTT) and private sector partners. 
By analyzing a sample of SAR programs in municipal law enforcement 
agencies, international SAR models, and the resource capabilities of fusion 
centers to local law enforcement, and comparing the analysis to the best 
practices identified by the NSI and other national strategic documents, the author 
can research the hypothesis and address the research questions. 
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II.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
For many decades, law enforcement has engaged the public to help 
prevent crime and identify offenders. Police and sheriff departments have 
managed anonymous tip line programs whereby community members can 
provide information to law enforcement and remain anonymous. Some tip lines 
are for specific purposes, such as narcotics information. Anonymous persons can 
report on suspected drug houses, persons selling drugs or other narcotic-related 
information. The use of anonymous tip lines has resulted in the identification and 
apprehension of violators, the rescue of victims and the prevention of crime. 
Since 9/11, anonymous tip lines have continued to be a tactic law enforcement 
uses to receive crime-related information from the public. However, SAR 
programs have been implemented to provide a forum for the public to report 
suspicious activity related to all crimes, as well as suspected terrorism-related 
activity. 
A. NATIONAL STRATEGIES AND SARS 
President George W. Bush established the Office of Homeland Security 
on October 8, 2001, soon after the 9/11 attacks and directed the office’s first 
responsibility to produce the first National Strategy for Homeland Security. 
President Bush adopted the 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security on 
July 16, 2002. President Bush recognized the document as a beginning or 
starting point for U.S. national homeland security efforts and that the strategy 
would be adjusted and amended over time (National Strategy for Homeland 
Security, 2002, p. vii). 
The 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security was the first ever 
homeland security national strategy. The purpose of the strategy was stated 
within the executive summary. “To mobilize and organize our Nation to secure 
the U.S. homeland from terrorist attacks” (National Strategy for Homeland 
Security, 2002).Three strategic objectives were identified in priority with the first 
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objective to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States. Intelligence and 
warning is one of the six critical mission areas focused on within the overall 
strategy. Noted in this critical mission area is the need for the intelligence 
community to identify, collect and analyze new information to help understand 
emerging threats (p. 15). The strategy synthesizes the concept that intelligence 
and information analysis is not separate, but rather a key component to prevent 
and reduce terrorism vulnerability. Actionable intelligence is essential for 
preventing acts of terrorism (p. 16). 
President Bush adopted The 2007 National Strategy for Homeland 
Security in October 2007, which became the second national strategy document 
(National Strategy for Homeland Security, 2007). President Bush clearly states 
that homeland security is a national effort with shared goals that requires the 
assistance of all Americans (p. 1). The strategy calls for the creation of an 
information-sharing environment that extends beyond terror-related intelligence 
(p. 49). All relevant and appropriate information will be shared throughout all 
levels of government and the private and non-profit sectors. The FBI has made 
progress in this area with the adoption of their 2011 National Information Sharing 
Strategy (NISS) and InfraGard. The goal of the NISS is to coordinate initiatives 
that emphasize the collection and dissemination of intelligence to meet national 
security and law enforcement needs (U.S. Department of Justice, Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, 2011). The three components of the NISS are the Law 
Enforcement National Data Exchange (N-DEx), OneDOJ, and Law Enforcement 
Online network (LEO) (U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, n.d.). N-DEx provides a nationwide capability for law enforcement 
to exchange data and police reports and automates patterns or linkages to detect 
crime and terrorism. OneDOJ allows the FBI to participate with federal, state, 
local and tribal law enforcement sharing systems. LEO is a web-based 
communication system for law enforcement to exchange information and 
participate in online education programs.  
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InfraGard is a partnership between the FBI and private sector dedicated to 
sharing information to prevent hostile acts against the United States (InfraGard, 
2012b). InfraGard chapters are housed at each of the FBI field offices. 
Memberships include law enforcement, the business community, academic 
institutions and other state and local agencies (InfraGard, 2012a). 
Although these programs appear they are structured to meet their goals of 
timely information gathering/sharing, data analysis and intelligence 
dissemination, they rely on people and organizations that must be willing to share 
information. Federal, state and local law enforcement have proven in the past to 
be less than cooperative in their information sharing efforts. 
In 2004, the President signed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act (IRTPA) (Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, 
2004). The Information Sharing Environment (ISE) was created from IRTPA. ISE 
facilitates the exchange of terrorism information among all levels of government, 
the private sector and foreign partners to disrupt terrorism and enhance 
homeland security. ISE supports the NSI (ISE—Information Sharing 
Environment, n.d.). Figure 1 represents the shared spaces network as described 
in the SAR Process Implementation Checklist (p. 17). Figure 2 represents how 
data is moved to shared spaces and how data is accessed by shared spaces 




Figure 1.   Shared Spaces Network 
 
Figure 2.   Shared Spaces Process 
As seen from Figure 2, the initial entry point for information is local 
sources. Local municipal law enforcement technology varies across the country. 
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Advanced technologies include computer aided dispatch (CAD) and records 
management systems (RMS). These systems coordinate incoming calls for 
service, service delivery and a computerized RMS. CAD/RMS systems have 
been operational for about three decades. They are very common in larger city 
and urban city policing. However, some agencies in rural and urban 
environments still do not have CAD/RMS systems. They even now rely on card 
cataloguing and paper filing of police reports. The antiquated systems make it 
difficult to share and participate in a shared network system. The potential exists 
that critical intelligence information is housed in these antiquated systems and 
can never be imported to a shared services network for analysis. 
In the past, CAD/RMS systems were independent from one another. 
Users could only access information within their own data system. To access 
other jurisdictions’ CAD/RMS data, a user would contact the agency and the 
agency would search for the information. For a more robust search, the party 
would have to contact multiple agencies and request multiple searches. Shared 
networks eliminate the redundancy and allow users access to multiple 
jurisdictions data, which can be accomplished almost instantaneously. 
COPLINK is a company that provides technology to law enforcement to 
establish shared networks or nodes of information sharing (IBM, IBM i2 
COPLINK, n.d.). Participants of these nodes can access the records 
management data of all the participating node agencies. Several of the nodes 
already exist in California. Participating agencies are not required to have the 
same CAD/RMS vendor. COPLINK is able to link all the systems and have the 
data readily assessable to users. COPLINK includes other features, such as link 
analysis and searching capabilities to assist in investigations. For example, an 
officer can query a search for subjects with a rose tattoo on their lower arm. All 
the RMS databases in the node will be queried. 
The advantage of the system rests in the fact that all the information and 
reports completed by a law enforcement agency are entered into the 
department’s CAD/RMS system in which all the work is accomplished. An officer 
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does not choose which reports or data will be entered into the system. It is all 
recorded. To be successful, a shared data system would need to work in the 
same manner. All of a department’s RMS data would need to be accessible to 
the shared network. A network that relies on a data entry decision will not serve 
the purposes of a shared data network solution.  
Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano adopted the 
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report (QHSR) in February 2010 (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2010). The primary purpose for the QHSR is 
to outline a strategic framework for the activities of the homeland security 
participants (p. vi). Homeland security is characterized as a shared responsibility 
or enterprise shared by all individuals, families and communities and 
governmental agencies (p. viii). The protection of the United States and its 
people, vital interests, and way of life is a key component of the QHSR. Its 
definition of Homeland Security and will require the abilities of millions of 
American citizens (p. 15). The enterprise requires a trained and educated 
America who can identify possible threats, such as a backpack left on a subway. 
The enterprise requires an America that builds real-time, shared information 
analysis that does not stovepipe, while not undermining civil liberties (p. 34). 
The QHSR refers to itself as a strategic document that outlines a strategic 
framework and is not a resource prioritization document (p. vi). Goal 1.1, Prevent 
Terrorist Attacks, has several objectives and one of the objectives is to engage 
communities (p. 39). Strategies include mechanisms for reporting suspicious 
activity, and enhance public preparedness and early warning systems. The 
document does not consider the budget ramifications to governmental agencies 
to adopt the various strategies. Program implementation requires personnel and 
operational costs. Municipal government already operates under tight budgetary 
constraints. The QHSR lacks the funding resource for government, and 
especially, local government, to accomplish the strategic framework, which is a 
major shortcoming of many of the strategic documents.  
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President Obama adopted the National Strategy for Counterterrorism in 
June 2011 (National Strategy for Counterterrorism, 2011). The focus of the 
strategy is the dismantling and defeat of al-Qa’ida (p. 1). The document is written 
in a more over-arching theme compared to the strategic details identified in the 
three previous strategies. However, community engagement and information 
sharing among all levels of law enforcement are identified as key tools to protect 
this homeland (p. 11). 
The National Strategy for Information Sharing, Success and Challenges In 
Improving Terrorism-Related Information Sharing was published in October 2007 
It is the first document by the Bush administration that articulates the national 
information sharing strategy in a single document (The National Strategy for 
Information Sharing, Success and Challenges In Improving Terrorism-Related 
Information Sharing, 2007, p. 1). The strategy is designed to improve interagency 
information sharing at the federal level and create information sharing systems 
between the federal level and non-federal partners. The strategy reinforces the 
multi-disciplinary and multi-governmental approach of information sharing and 
the role of the private sector, foreign partners and allies. A two-way flow of 
information with the federal government must exist between the state, local and 
tribal sectors. The strategy identifies the state and major urban area fusion 
centers and ISE as the key organizations to link the local, state and federal 
information sharing efforts. The strategy does not specifically address SAR 
systems at the local level. Also missing from the strategy is an emphasis on the 
collective American public and its role in information sharing. The focus of the 
strategy document is a synthesis of all government partners and the private 
sector. The document claims to be in alignment with previous National Homeland 
Security Strategy documents. 
The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), Bureau of Justice Assistance 
(BJA) developed the Suspicious Activity Reporting, Process Implementation 
Checklist in 2008 (U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance, 
2008). The document provides a blueprint on how local law enforcement 
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agencies can implement a SAR program. The document recognizes that law 
enforcement agencies have been gathering and sharing information for years on 
criminal behavior and activity to detect, prevent and solve crimes. SAR can be 
implemented within agencies’ current frameworks to gather, document, process, 
analyze and share information indicative of criminal behavior and/or terrorism. 
The checklist includes the Chief Executive’s role, SAR process development, 
incorporation of national guidelines into standard operating procedures, 
implementation of privacy policy, training of agency personnel, institutionalization 
of the agency, and the education of the public and partnering with other 
networks. For example, the ISE Shared Spaces Solution allows law enforcement 
agencies to share information with other agencies without directly accessing 
each other’s databases (U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice 
Assistance, 2008, p. 16). The Shared Spaces Solution may be the link to allow 
the two-way communication between a local SAR effort and its state and federal 
partners. 
The Information Sharing Environment provides analysts, operators and 
investigators the ability to enhance U.S. national security. According to ISE’s 
2010 annual report to Congress, the NSI is the nation’s neighborhood watch. ISE 
describes the NSI as its most significant accomplishment since the deficiencies 
highlighted by the 9/11 Commission (Information Sharing Environment Annual 
Report to Congress, 2010).  
As mentioned earlier, 75% of law enforcement agencies in the United 
States serve populations less than 10,000. The document does not speak to the 
large number of police departments that do not have access to computers and 
cannot participate in a shared spaces solution. Strategies need to be developed 
to allow all law enforcement agencies the ability to participate in the information-
sharing environment. 
The NSI was mandated to establish a unified process for reporting, 
tracking and accessing SARs in a manner that protects civil liberties as directed 
by the National Strategy for Information Sharing. The NSI strategy included the 
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development of a common method to collect, document, process, analyze and 
share SAR intelligence (Figure 3). The cycle represents the path of information 
from the observation by the initial officer, supervisor review, information 
forwarded to Joint Terrorism Task Force/Fusion Center (JTTF) and the 
continuing analysis, processing and dissemination. The Program Management 
Office (PMO) is responsible for the nationwide implementation of a SAR process 
by coordinating existing resources and managing additional support (Nationwide 
SAR Initiative, n.d.b.). The PMO was established in March 2010. The established 
process allows information to be received at the local level. The local level can 
vet the information and forward it to the local JTTF. The information is further 
analyzed and entered into the Shared Spaces Solution database. Government 
agencies can access the shared database as needed. The NSI ensures that 
terrorism-related SARS are available to federal, state and local law enforcement 
agencies and state and major urban area fusion centers. The JTTF or fusion 
center will determine the actions required as a result of the analysis. 
 
 
Figure 3.   SAR Cycle (From: Nationwide SAR Initiative, n.d.b., p .4) 
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One of the shortcomings of the SAR cycle is that information does not get 
pushed back to the local authorities. Locals input into the process, but must 
access the shared spaces database to retrieve information, which requires a 
conscious act by locals. Analysis and intelligence should be pushed out to the 
locals that would ensure that the intelligence went back to the agency. It would 
still be desirable for locals to engage the database for SAR and other related 
information actively. 
Training of frontline law enforcement in the indicators of suspicious 
terrorist-related activity is another key element in the SAR cycle. This component 
can be challenging to local law enforcement. Smaller agencies already have 
limited personnel resources. In California, the Commission on Peace Officers 
Standards and Training (POST) regulates police training and certification. POST 
requires 24 hours of continuing professional training every two years for police 
officers. POST has other perishable skills training mandates (first aid, emergency 
operation of vehicles, arrest control tactics, and firearms) which add to the 
training requirements. Additional training will add more of a burden on local law 
enforcement. Creative solutions should be considered that include train the 
trainer programs, distance learning, DVD roll-call training, state or federal 
reimbursement programs for training, backfill funding for officers sent to training, 
and localized training through JTTFs. 
The document Findings and Recommendations of the Suspicious Activity 
Report, Support and Implementation Project was published in June 2008. The 
DOJ, BJA, Major Cities Chiefs Association, the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating 
Council and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security sponsored and 
developed the report. The Office of the Program Manager of ISE assisted in the 
project. The Los Angeles Police Department and Police Chief William Bratton 
contributed to the document along with executives from other major U.S. 
municipal police departments.  
The Major Cities Chiefs Association (MCC) is comprised of the 63 largest 
police and sheriff agencies in the United States. It serves 68 million people in the 
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United States and represents a workforce of 159,000 sworn and non-sworn 
personnel (Major Cities Chiefs Police Association, 2012). The MCC was formed 
to provide a forum for large urban area law enforcement agencies to discuss its 
challenges.  
The purpose of the Findings and Recommendations of the SAR Support 
and Implementation Project is to describe the all-crimes approach to gathering, 
processing, reporting, analyzing, and sharing of suspicious activity by the local 
police agency (Findings and Recommendations of the Suspicious Activity Report, 
Support and Implementation Project, 2008). The report and its recommendations 
establish guidelines for the timely sharing of SAR information (p. 1). Over 17,000 
law enforcement agencies in the United States document suspicious activity and 
some terrorist related, and therefore, national standardization is necessary (p. 6). 
The project focused its recommendations in the following key areas. 
• Executive leadership 
• Privacy and civil liberties protection 
• Gathering, processing, reporting, analyzing, and sharing of 
suspicious activity 
• Standard reporting format and data collection codes 
• Training and community outreach 
• Technology 
In all the key areas, major findings were identified and recommended for 
agencies that have implemented SAR programs or for those agencies that intend 
to adopt a program. The overarching theme is the implementation of a SAR 
program that has the ability to analyze information, take appropriate action and 
share the information with its local, state and federal partners in a timely manner. 
Further analysis was obtained through site visits to the Chicago, Los Angeles, 
Boston and Miami-Dade police departments. 
A shortcoming of the entre document and its findings is that law 
enforcement was represented by the MCC, which represents less than 25% of 
the population of the United States and about 20% of the law enforcement 
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personnel. The challenges confronting MCC and the rest of law enforcement are 
different. Agencies that are not members of MCC operate with much smaller 
budgets and personnel. MCC does not represent all of law enforcement. 
Development of these types of initiatives should always include representatives 
of smaller agencies more indicative of policing in the United States. 
The overall recommendations in the key areas are valid, but may be 
unattainable for the typical law enforcement agency in the United States. For 
example, the technology chapter recommends agencies use virtual fusion 
centers, computer aided dispatch technology, computer records management 
systems, electronic reporting systems for field incidents, and mapping tools. 
These technology recommendations may be cost prohibitive at smaller law 
enforcement jurisdictions. SAR relies on the timely gathering and analyzing of 
information and agencies without the technology enhancements might not be 
able to meet national SAR standards. Perspective from a wider demographic 
sample of police agencies would have benefited the process. 
The document Suspicious Activity Reporting, Process Implementation 
Checklist is a companion document to the Findings and Recommendations of the 
Suspicious Activity Report Support and Implementation Project document dated 
June 2008. The checklist document identifies key components and action items 
necessary to implement a comprehensive SAR process that will aid agencies in 
crime prevention efforts and incorporate agencies into the nationwide SAR 
process (U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2008, p. 3). 
A SAR is defined as “official documentation of observed behavior reasonably 
indicative of preoperational planning related to terrorism or other criminal 
behavior” (U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2008, p. 2). 
The SAR implementation checklist identified the following eight strategic areas. 
1. Leadership must recognize the importance of implementing a SAR 
process 
2. Identify existing SAR processes and determine what SAR 
processes need to be developed 
3. Incorporate national guidelines into standard operating procedures 
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4. Implement an agency privacy policy 
5. Train all agency personnel on the SAR process 
6. Institutionalize the SAR process within the agency 
7. Educate the community on the SAR process 
8. Partner with others and connect to information sharing networks 
In addition to the eight categories, 41 sub-action items are designed to 
assist agencies in reaching the desired outcome of the eight strategic areas. The 
action items are a “how to” for agencies to consider when implementing a SAR 
process. 
The process implementation checklist document is a 20-page brief 
overview highlighting the key areas and action items to implement a SAR. It is a 
companion document to the more detailed 49 page Findings and 
Recommendations of the Suspicious Activity Report Support and Implementation 
Project document. However, the national standards for SAR are clearly identified 
and supported by action items. The document is a good resource to gain an 
initial understanding of SAR and the components of a model SAR program. 
The eight strategic checklist areas clearly address the key components of 
leadership, national standards, privacy policy, training of personnel, education of 
the community, and the use of information sharing networks. These core 
initiatives should be considered prior to adopting a SAR program. 
B. FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL SAR INITIATIVES 
A list follows of some of the various SAR programs in use by agencies and 
how the public can gain access. 
• Department of Homeland Security (DHS): The DHS website links 
users to the “FBI Tips and Public Leads.” The purpose is to report 
suspected criminal or terrorist activity. The link is navigated through 
the Counterterrorism tab on the homepage (U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, n.d.a.). In July 2010, the DHS launched a 
national public awareness campaign of the “If you see something, 
say something” program developed by the New York Metropolitan 
Transportation Authority. The campaign includes marketing on 
television with the goal to raise public awareness of the indicators 
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of terrorism and criminal activity. The campaign respects civil rights 
or civil liberties by emphasizing behavior, rather than appearance, 
in identifying suspicious activity. Observers are encouraged to 
report suspicious activity to their local law enforcement or dial 911. 
• Federal Bureau of Investigation: “FBI Tips and Public Leads” is 
navigated through the FBI homepage at the Contact Us tab and 
drop down Submit a Tip on Crime/Terrorism. The submittal page 
states an FBI agent or professional staff member will review the 
information promptly. Local office websites do not have direct web 
reporting of suspicious activity. The local office provides a phone 
number to report criminal activity or a user can navigate to the main 
FBI website and report activity as described earlier (Federal Bureau 
of Investigation, n.d.).  
• New York Police Department (NYPD): From the menu on the 
homepage, a user can navigate to the Submit Internet Tip 
webpage. The Counterterrorism link does not have a function for 
the public to report suspicious activity (New York Police 
Department, n.d.). 
• New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA): The MTA 
adopted the “If You See Something, Say Something” public 
awareness program. The MTA encourages passengers to phone 
police if they see something suspicious. The MTA provides the 
following information to their passengers on its website 
(Metropolitan Transportation Authority, n.d.). 
• Be alert to unattended packages 
• Be wary of suspicious behavior 
• Take notice of people in bulky or inappropriate clothing 
• Report exposed wiring or other irregularities 
• Report anyone tampering with surveillance cameras or 
entering unauthorized areas 
• Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD): LAPD’s iWatch program is 
accessed at the department’s homepage by a 1-inch picture of the 
program’s logo. IWatch is a community awareness program created 
to educate the public about behaviors and activities that may have 
a connection to terrorism or other criminal activity. Web users are 
directed to a tool to report the suspicious behavior (Los Angeles 
Police Department, n.d.). 
• Anaheim California Police Department SAR: SAR is accessed via 
the homepage. Users are directed to the SAR page from the Crime 
& Prevention link. The SAR page includes additional links and 
information, which include a definition of SAR, pre-attack indicators, 
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criminal activity tips, and important links. The website allows users 
to submit suspected criminal behavior. Users are required to 
provide personal information for contact. If personal information is 
not provided, the submitter cannot proceed to subsequent entry 
pages. The Important Links page directs user to a variety of 
government training bulletins identifying potential indicators of 
terrorist activities (Anaheim Police Department, n.d.).  
C. INTERNATIONAL MODELS 
1. SAR in the United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom (UK) has been engaged in the war on terrorism much 
longer than the United States. The Irish Republic Army and Muslim extremists 
have conducted violent terrorist attacks in England and Ireland for many years. 
The United Kingdom is a likely country to examine counterterrorist strategies, 
and specifically, the use of public awareness campaigns directed at suspicious 
activity reporting.  
a. The UK’s Strategy for Countering International 
Terrorism (March 2009) 
The aim of the UK’s 2009 strategy was to reduce the risk to the 
United Kingdom and its interests overseas from international terrorism, so that 
people can go about their lives freely and with confidence (The United Kingdom’s 
Strategy for Countering International Terrorism, 2009, p. 8). The UK’s strategies 
are based on four key frameworks: pursue, prevent, protect, and prepare (p. 13). 
The pursue (stop terrorist attacks), prevent (stop people from becoming 
terrorists) and protect (strengthen protection against terrorist attack) strategies 
have a direct link to community awareness and reporting campaigns. These 
strategies recognize the importance of community involvement and 
communication in pursuing, preventing and protecting the United Kingdom from 
terrorism. All communities are needed to stand up and reject violent extremism 
(p. 55).  
The Metropolitan Police Service’s (MPS) anti-terrorist public 
awareness campaigns and SAR are linked to the broader UK’s strategy for 
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countering international terrorism. The MPS’s strategies provide a link to the 
community to share observable information with law enforcement in an attempt to 
pursue terrorists, prevent terrorism, and protect the United Kingdom from terrorist 
attacks. 
b. Metropolitan Police Service 
The MPS serves the greater London area. The MPS employs over 
52,000 personnel of which 33,000 are officers. The MPS headquarters is located 
in the New Scotland Yard and has over 140 police stations. The MPS polices an 
area over 600 square miles. 
From the MPS website homepage, the user can select “Counter 
Terrorism” and access information to report suspicious activity via the 
confidential Anti-Terrorist Hotline (Metropolitan Police Services, n.d.). The hotline 
is staffed at all times by counter-terrorism police officers and professional staff. 
Users are also directed to a link to report online activity believed to be terrorist 
related at Directgov, which encourages online users to report the following 
activity (Directgov, Crime and Justice, n.d.).  
• Speeches or essays calling for racial or religious violence 
• Videos of violence with messages of praise for the attackers 
• Chat forums with postings calling for people to commit acts of 
terrorism 
• Messages intended to stir up hatred against any religious or ethnic 
group 
• Instructions on how to make weapons, poisons or bombs 
The MPS combines SAR with a public awareness campaign that 
includes the distribution of posters, window stickers, radio messaging and stories 
in the local newspapers. The goal is to educate and train all citizens of indicators 
of suspicious activity and the process for reporting information. 
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2. SAR in Israel 
In April 2009, the Department of Homeland Security Office of Science and 
Technology published the report “Public Role and Engagement in 
Counterterrorism Efforts: Implications of Israeli Practices for the U.S.” The study 
examined the Israeli approach to public engagement in counterterrorism efforts 
and identified successfully used practices by Israel to leverage the public to deter 
and defeat terrorist attacks (p. 1). The two key findings of the study are the 
following. 
1. The Israeli public plays a significant role in the counterterrorism 
efforts 
2. The government has adopted a fourfold strategy of effective public 
participation, which includes a well-educated public in the reporting 
of suspicious activity (p. 2). 
Dr. Ariel Merari, head of the Center for Political Violence at Tel Aviv 
University and a leading researcher on suicide bombings in Israel, points to 
public participation as being “one of the cornerstones of Israeli defensive 
measures against terrorism in the domestic arena” (Public Role and Engagement 
in Counterterrorism Efforts: Implications of Israeli Practices for the U.S., 2009, p. 
48). 
Merari added, “Much of Israel’s success in thwarting terrorist bombings 
can be attributed to public awareness. The majority of explosive devices planted 
in public sites such as bus stations, supermarkets, and shopping centers have 
been discovered by civilians who were able to alert the police before the bombs 
went off. Public alertness has been encouraged by police advertisements on 
television and other media, but the main reason for this high-level alertness has 
undoubtedly been the Israeli public’s identification with the struggle against 
terrorism” (Public Role and Engagement in Counterterrorism Efforts: Implications 
of Israeli Practices for the U.S., 2009, p. 48). 
The Israeli Police, through its Community and Civil Guard Department, 
started a campaign in 2002 entitled “Terror—Let’s Stop it Together.” Pamphlets 
were issued to the public that provided guidance on the following: suspicious 
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signs that can give away a suicide bomber, including external appearance, 
suspicious behavior, and suspicious equipment; how to identify a suspicious 
vehicle; what to do in the event you suspect something (Public Role and 
Engagement in Counterterrorism Efforts: Implications of Israeli Practices for the 
U.S., 2009, p. 50). 
The Israeli Home Front Command hosts a website that provides the Israeli 
people information on emergency preparedness, emergency response, search 
and rescue and training. The site serves as its community outreach platform. The 
site educates the public on suspicious objects, vehicles, and individuals. The 
National Police are the point of contact for SAR and all tips are received at the 
“Dial 100” telephone number (Public Role and Engagement in Counterterrorism 
Efforts: Implications of Israeli Practices for the U.S., 2009, p. 53). The same 
number serves the entire country. Not all public outreach programs proved 
successful. The Israeli Security Authority (ISA) sponsored a “tips hotline,” 
through which the public could relay information. However, the hotline was 
terminated because the large volume of calls resulted in wasted efforts by the 
agency following up information that ultimately did not prove beneficial (Public 
Role and Engagement in Counterterrorism Efforts: Implications of Israeli 
Practices for the U.S., 2009, p. 53). The National Police assess all information 
received through the “Dial 100” program and forward terrorist-related information 
to the ISA. 
3. Legal and Privacy Issues 
SAR has not been without its distracters who are concerned about the 
privacy and records retention aspects of SAR programs. In July 2008, Mike 
German and Jay Stanley authored an article entitled “Fusion Center Update” for 
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). According to German and Stanley, 
SAR policing opens the door to racial profiling and other improper police 
behavior, and exposes law-abiding people to government prying into their private 
affairs without just cause (German & Stanley, 2008, p. 2). 
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The collection of “non-criminal” information is counter to Title 28, Part 23 
of the Code of Federal Regulations, which states that law enforcement agencies: 
“shall collect and maintain criminal intelligence information concerning an 
individual only if there is reasonable suspicion that the individual is involved in 
criminal conduct or activity and the information is relevant to that criminal conduct 
or activity.” German and Stanley site several examples of people detained by law 
enforcement in the United States for perceived suspicious behavior and when it 
was later determined that no illegal activity occurred.  
On July 29, 2010, the ACLU published an article in their newsletter entitled 
“More About Suspicious Activity Reporting.” The article contends that SAR 
programs increase the probability that police will stop innocent people and have 
their personal information included in law enforcement databases. SAR opens 
the door to racial profiling and other improper police practices. The ACLU argues 
that oversight is needed to ensure the reasonable suspicion threshold is met in 
SAR programs and intelligence gathering. 
The DHS and the DOJ Fusion Process Technical Assistance Program and 
Services sponsored the 56-page Fusion Center Privacy Development document 
dated April 2010 (DHS/DOJ Fusion Process Technical Assistance Program and 
Services, 2010). Although the document is written specifically for fusion centers), 
the same privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties concerns associated with fusion 
centers are also applicable to SAR programs. More importantly, SAR programs 
are a component of fusion centers across the country. The document recognizes 
that intelligence fusion centers are an efficient and effective mechanism to 
exchange information and fight crime and terrorism by analyzing data from a 
variety of resources (p. 1). Privacy and civil liberties protection policies must be in 
place. The purpose of a privacy policy is to ensure the center will abide by legal 
requirements that protect constitutional rights as fusion centers gather and share 
information. 
The document includes a comprehensive policy development template 
(DHS/DOJ Fusion Process Technical Assistance Program and Services, 2010, 
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pp. 5–37). The template is presented in a workbook model, which guide policy 
developers through a series of questions and sample language. The document 
includes all the pertinent areas of concern for policy developers to consider when 
crafting a policy for their fusion center or local law enforcement SAR system.  
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III.  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
A website audit was the primary methodology to address the question if a 
gap exists in the SAR systems implemented by smaller law enforcement 
agencies in the United States. An audit was conducted of the California police 
departments that contribute to the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) for the DOJ 
whose populations range from 10,000 to over one million (U.S. Department of 
Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2010). Websites were audited for the 
existence of SAR programs, tip line programs, and links to federal, state or fusion 
centers SAR programs. The websites were also audited for terrorism prevention 
and crime prevention information. In all, 355 California police department 
websites were audited. The audits were categorized by the following city 
populations serviced by the police agency (see Appendix A). 
• 10,000 to 24,999: 103 agencies 
• 25,000 to 49,999: 90 agencies 
• 50,000 to 99,000: 99 agencies 
• 100,000 to 249,000: 50 agencies 
• 250,000 to 499,000: 9 agencies 
• 500.000 to 999,000: 2 agencies 
• Over one million: 2 agencies 
The categories are consistent with the DOJ UCR of crime statistics 
population categories. The population of each city was determined through 
census data and recorded. Census data was analyzed to determine the 
percentage of population between specific categories, as well as to the total 
population serviced by the 355 UCR agencies.  
The research identified model SAR programs implemented in the United 
States, New York Police Department, New York Metropolitan Transportation 
Authority, LAPD and the Anaheim Police Department (Anaheim, CA). The term 
model was defined as a SAR program that aligned with the recommendations of 
the Suspicious Activity Reporting, Process Implementation Checklist document 
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or other appropriate national or international standards and legal tests. Further 
analysis of the model agencies explored examples of SAR that resulted in the 
disruption or identification of a homeland security issue. Special attention was 
given to programs that could be replicated using limited resources.  
An audit of a sampling of the training offered by fusion centers was 
conducted. Included in the audit were the topic of training, method of delivery, 
frequency of the training and the availability. The analysis included the 
geographic locations of the fusion centers, which aided in determining the span 
of control of the fusion center and the possible disconnect from law enforcement 
agencies. 
Policy analysis was the method used to examine the privacy issues 
related to SAR reporting. The Fusion Center Privacy Policy Development 
document served as a resource. Other government documents, litigation/case 
law, as well as research conducted by the ACLU was examined. These policies 
form the basis to analyze and compare model SAR programs and their 
adherence to privacy policy best practices. 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
A. POPULATION GROUPS AND CATEGORIES ANALYSIS 
According to the California Police Chiefs Association, 334 municipal police 
agencies represent about 70% of the California population. The remainder of the 
population is serviced by a sheriff’s office either directly or through contract 
services. Agencies selected for this research analysis included all the California 
police agencies that contribute crime data annually to the DOJ UCR. The DOJ 
records crime data for all cities in the United States from law enforcement 
agencies serving populations from 10,000 to over million. The cities are 
distributed in seven population categories. The agencies reflected are 
predominately municipal police departments, but also include cities that contract 
sheriff services. In 2010, 355 California police departments contributed crime 
data to the DOJ UCR (U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, 2010). 
Each of the 355 websites was accessed and searched for SAR programs, 
tip line programs, links to other state, federal or fusion center SAR programs, 
terrorism prevention information and crime prevention information. The audits 
were conducted using the same population categories as reported by the DOJ 
UCR. The presence of these programs indicates the level of participation by 
California police departments of SAR programs. 
The population serviced by the 355 agencies that contributed data to the 
UCR was 29,270,474. The population of the state of California is 37,691,912. 
The 355 agencies represent 77.6% of the population of California and 9.3% of 
the population of the United States, 311,591,917 (see Table 1). The 355 
agencies represent a large sample of the overall California population. Although 
the sample size, 9.3%, is much smaller compared to the U.S. population, it is still 







United States 311,591,917 (U.S. Census Bureau, n.d.).  
California 37,691,912 (U.S. Census Bureau, n.d.). 12.1% 
Cities Audited 29,270,474 9.3% 
Table 1.   United States and California Population 
The largest numbers of agencies are represented in the 10,000 to 24,999 
category with 103 agencies, or 29% of the total agencies. However, the 
population served by this category is 1.7 million or 5.8% of the represented 
population. The 100,000 to 249,999 category represents the largest percentile of 
the population at 24.8%, and 14% of the total UCR agencies. The categories 
from 10,000 to 249,999 population represent 342 agencies or 96.3% of the total 
agencies and 64.7% of the total population. Combined, the category 50,000 to 
99,999 and 100,000 to 249,000 represent 41.9% of the agencies and 47.8% of 
the total population (see Table 2). The cities of Los Angeles and San Diego 
represent the two cities in the over one million category. They account for over 











10,000 to 24,999 103 1,725,525 5.8% 
25,000 to 49,999 90 3,217,454 10.9% 
50,000 to 99,999 99 6,749,065 23.0% 
100,000 to 249,999 50 7,270,139 24.8% 
250,000 to 499,999 9 3,462,886 11.8% 
500,000 to 999,999 2 1,751,177 5.9% 
Over One Million 2 5,094,228 17.4% 
Totals 355 29,270,474 100.00% 
Table 2.   Total Agencies and Populations Served 
1. Overall Results 
Overall results of the website audits are tabulated in Table 3. Of the 355 
police department websites, 21 included a SAR program. SAR programs are only 
present in 5.9% of the total number of agencies. Terrorism prevention information 
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is less represented at 3.9% or 14 of the police department websites. Links to 
federal, state or fusion center SAR websites were found on 67 of the websites or 
18.8 percent. The more traditional law enforcement anonymous tip line and crime 
prevention programs were more prevalent. Tip lines were present in 40.5% of the 
websites and crime prevention information in 58 percent. 
Overall SAR program participation, 5.9% of police departments, is 
significantly underrepresented and does not meet the directives of U.S. national 
strategy documents as discussed earlier. The public does not have a local forum 
to report suspicious activity. California police departments lack a system to 
receive terrorism-related information from the public and analyze it for 
intelligence distribution and action. Although tip lines are more common, they are 
present in less than half of California police departments. 
 
Criteria Number of 
Agencies 
Percentage of 
355 Total Police 
Departments  
SAR 21 5.9% 
Tip line 144 40.5% 
Link to Federal, State, Fusion Center SAR 67 18.8% 
Terrorism Prevention Information Viewable 14 3.9% 
Crime Prevention Information Viewable 203 58.0% 
Table 3.   Overall Results 
In the population category of 10,000 to 24,999, all five audited categories 
fall below the overall findings (see Table 4). SAR programs were present in 3.8% 
of the websites compared to the overall findings of 5.9 percent. In all, only four of 
the 103 agencies in this category displayed a SAR program on their website. Tip 
line programs were found in 32 of the 103 agencies or 31% compared to 40.5% 
of all agencies combined. An even steeper decline in the crime prevention 
category existed at 34.9% compared to the overall rate of 58 percent. 
The data suggest that smaller agencies are less likely to incorporate these 
types of services or programs in their departments. The reason may be the lack 
of resources available to departments, such as personnel, technology or funding. 
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SAR 4 3.8% 
Tip line 32 31.0% 
Link to Federal, State, Fusion Center SAR 18 17.4% 
Terrorism Prevention Information Viewable 4 3.8% 
Crime Prevention Information Viewable 36 34.9% 
Table 4.   10,000–24,999: 103 Total Agencies, Population Served: 1,725,525 
In the population category 25,000 to 49,999, four of the five audited 
categories fell below the overall results, but the figures were closely consistent 
with the overall results (see Table 5). SAR programs were present in four of the 
99 agencies or 4.4% compared to 5.9% in overall results. The link to federal, 
state, and fusion center SAR programs was present in 22.2% of the websites 
compared to 18.8% in the overall results. As with the 10,000 to 24,999 category, 
the 25,000 to 49,000 category significantly lacked the presence of SAR programs 
and terrorism prevention information. 
 




SAR 4 4.4% 
Tip line 34 37.7% 
Link to Federal, State, Fusion Center SAR 20 22.2% 
Terrorism Prevention Information Viewable 2 2.2% 
Crime Prevention Information Viewable 50 55.5% 
Table 5.   825,000–49,999: 90 Total Agencies, Population Served: 3,217,454 
The population category 50,000 to 99,999 represented the second highest 
population group at 23% or 6,749,055 with 99 police agencies reporting. The 
group exceeded the overall results in four of the five categories (see Table 6). 
The most significant difference was the crime prevention category, which was 
represented in 71.7% of the police departments compared to 58% in the overall 
results. The tip line category increased from 40.5% to 51.5% and the link 
category from 18.8% to 25.2 percent. 
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A SAR program was found on 6% of the police department websites in the 
category. Again, SAR programs are significantly underrepresented programs on 
police department websites. 
 




SAR 6 6.0% 
Tip line 51 51.5% 
Link to Federal, State, Fusion Center SAR 25 25.2% 
Terrorism Prevention Information Viewable 3 3.0% 
Crime Prevention Information Viewable 71 71.7% 
Table 6.   950,000–99,999: 99 Total Agencies, Population Served: 6,749,065  
The population category 100,000 to 249,999 represented the highest 
population group at 24.8% or 7,270,139 with 50 police agencies reporting. The 
category fell below the overall results in four of the five categories (see Table 7). 
Crime prevention information was present in 78% of the websites compared to 
58% in the overall results. Only one agency displayed a SAR program on its 
website and one agency displayed a link to federal or state resources.  
The results are in contrast to the 50,000 to 99,999 group that exceeded 
overall results in four of the five categories. With larger agencies, greater 
resources and the ability for agencies to adopt terrorism prevention type 
programs would be expected. However, the presence of such programs was less 
present in this category than the overall results and the 50,000 to 99,999 group. 




SAR 1 2.0% 
Tip line 19 38.0% 
Link to Federal, State, Fusion 
Center SAR 
1 2.0% 
Terrorism Prevention Information 
Viewable 
1 2.0% 
Crime Prevention Information 
Viewable 
39 78.0% 
Table 7.   100,000–249,999: 50 Total Agencies, Population Served: 
7,270,139 
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The 250,000 to 499,999 category represented 11.8% of the total 
population with nine agencies reporting to the UCR. The Fresno Police 
Department’s UCR data was reported by the DOJ in this category even though 
their population is 510,365. The group exceeded the overall results in four of the 
five categories. SAR programs were present on 55.5% of the department 
websites compared to the overall result of 5.9 percent. Terrorism prevention 
information was present on 33.3% of the websites compared to 3.9% of the 
overall results. Tip line programs exceeded the overall results by 15% and the 
link to federal, state and fusion center SAR increased by 3.4 percent. Crime 
prevention information was present on 33.3% of the websites compared to 58% 
of the overall results (see Table 8).  
Although the presence of the categories and programs increased in four 
areas, and in some cases significantly, the fact that the population group is 
represented by only nine police agencies needs to be considered. However, the 
result may be an indicator that agencies in this population group are better 
positioned to staff and maintain these types of terrorism preventative programs. 
 




SAR 5 55.5% 
Tip line 5 55.5% 
Link to Federal, State, Fusion Center SAR 2 22.2% 
Terrorism Prevention Information Viewable 3 33.3% 
Crime Prevention Information Viewable 3 33.3% 
Table 8.   11250,000–499,999: 9 Total Agencies, Population: Served 
3,462,886 
The population group 500,000 to 999,999 was represented by two 
agencies with a total population of 1,751,177 or 5.9% of the overall reporting 
population. Both agencies hosted a tip line and crime prevention information on 
their websites, but none of the three remaining categories were present (see 
Table 9).  
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The category population is about the same as the 10,000 to 24,999 
category at 5.8 percent. However, 103 police departments represent the latter 
category. A trend does not seem to be established that as departments increase 
in size, they are more likely to include terrorism preventative programs for the 
public to access. 
 




SAR 0 0% 
Tipline 2 100% 
Link to Federal, State, Fusion Center SAR 0 0% 
Terrorism Prevention Information Viewable 0 0% 
Crime Prevention Information Viewable 2 100% 
Table 9.   500,000–999,999: 2 Total Agencies, Population Served: 1,751,177 
The one million plus category included two police agencies and 
represented 17.4% of the population or 5,094,228 (see Table 10). One of the 
agencies included all the programs on their website and the second agency 
included crime prevention information only.  
 




SAR 1 50% 
Tip line 1 50% 
Link to Federal, State, Fusion Center SAR 1 50% 
Terrorism Prevention Information Viewable 1 50% 
Crime Prevention Information Viewable 2 100% 
Table 10.   One Million +: 2 Total Agencies, Population Served: 5,094,228 
2.  Summary 
Figure 14 summarizes the population groups and categories. The bottom 
number in the group column represents the number of police agencies in each 
grouping. The top number in the population column represents the group 
percentage compared to the total population of the 355 agencies that contributed 
to the UCR. The bottom number is the actual population. The remaining numbers 
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and percentages reflect the number of department websites that included a SAR 
program, tip line program, link to other state, federal or fusion center SARs, terror 
prevention information or crime prevention information and the associated 
percentage. 
Overall, SAR programs are only found on 21 websites for 5.9% of the 355 
audited police department websites. With the exception of the 250,000 to 
499,000 and one million plus categories, SAR programs are nearly non-existent 
(15 of 344 websites/4.3%). The 250,000 and one million plus category account 
for six SAR programs at 11 websites, 54.5 percent. The three largest population 
groups (250,000 to one million plus) reflect 35.1% of the population with 13 total 
police departments. An effort by these 13 departments to adopt SAR website 
programs would impact the public’s ability to report suspicious activity.  
The two most populated groups are 50,000 to 99,999 and 100,000 to 
249,999. The groups account for 47.8% of the population and 149 police 
agencies. Of the 149 agencies, only seven have a SAR program on their 
website. Of those same 149 agencies, 26 had a link to a federal, state or fusion 
center SAR. It may be more practical for these agencies to provide the public 
with links to SAR programs rather than support their own SAR program.  
The 10,000 to 24,999 and 500,000 to 999,999 categories represent nearly 
the same population at 5.8% and 5.9%, respectively. However, the former group 
reflects 103 police agencies and the latter only two. The two departments in the 
500,000 to 999,999 group might more easily adopt their own programs while the 
smaller agency group may be better served by linking to other resources. 
The presence of terrorism-related prevention and education information 
follows the same trend as the SAR programs. Only 14 websites provided any 
information to the public (3.9% of 355 websites). Combined, SAR (5.9%) and 




terrorism-related information through a website. With the addition of tip line 
programs (144 agencies/40.5%), the public has even a greater opportunity to 
report suspicious behavior. 
 















































































































Table 11.   Summary of the Population Groups and Categories 
A secondary audit was conducted to verify the results of the website audit 
methodology. In the absence of a department sponsored website SAR program, 
agencies may have other mechanisms whereby members of the public can 
report suspicious activity related to terrorism directly to the agency. Of the 355 
California police agencies, 117 were contacted and inquired about SAR 
programming. To ensure a level of randomness, every third agency by 
alphabetical order was selected. 
Phone contact was made with each department. Departments were asked 
if they had a specific phone line to accept suspicious activity related to terrorism 
and if they had any other means for the public to report SAR directly to the 
agency. Of the 117 agencies, three or 2.6%, responded they had a phone line or 
other mechanism for the public to report suspicious activity directly to them (see 
Appendix B). 
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The results are consistent with the website audit. A very small percentage 
of California police agencies, 5.9%, support a SAR program on their website and 
2.6% support a mechanism that the public can report suspicious terrorist activity 
directly to the agency.  
The audits did not explore the department’s ability to report suspicious 
activity to the appropriate authority, JTTF or fusion center. The research is 
focused on the ability for members of the public to report suspicious activity 
directly to their agency of jurisdiction through a SAR supported program.  
B. FUSION CENTER RESOURCES ANALYSIS 
The DHS website states that fusion centers receive information from a 
variety of sources, including SAR from stakeholders within their jurisdictions, as 
well as federal information and intelligence. They analyze the information and 
develop relevant products to disseminate to their customers. These products 
assist homeland security partners at all levels of government to identify and 
address immediate and emerging threats (U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, n.d.b.; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, n.d.c.); Criminal 
Intelligence Training Master Calendar, n.d.). 
There are 73 fusion centers across the country and at least one fusion 
center in each state (see Appendix C for a complete list of fusion centers) 
(National Fusion Center Association, n.d.).  
Fusion centers facilitate a wide variety of training for the law enforcement 
community. The training is conducted at locations within the geographic 
boundaries of the individual fusion centers. Local law enforcement agencies can 
host the training to bring the training sites closer to the first responders. In 2011, 
the DHS offered 66 classes across the United States in the intelligence analysis 
field of study. The courses were available to local law enforcement practitioners. 
For a complete list of training for 2011, refer to Appendix D. 
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Other local fusion centers offer additional specialized training to enhance 
homeland security preparedness and first responder skills. The Northern 
California Regional Intelligence Center (NCRIC) offers courses throughout the 
year in a variety of topics including intelligence analysis, basic and intermediate 
Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO), improvised explosive devices, Muslim 
extremism, surveillance detection for critical infrastructure and key resources 
(CI/KR), civil liberties and many others. The classes do not require tuition and are 
held at venues within driving distances for regional participants (see Appendix E 
for July–August 2012 calendar).  
In 2005, the New York State Office of Homeland Security (OHS) 
announced the plans to develop a State Preparedness Training Center. The 
training center is now located at the Oneida Airport in New York. The mission of 
OHS as stated in the Office of Counter Terrorism New York State Division of 
Homeland Security & Emergency Services website is, “The mission of OHS in 
this charge is to coordinate WMD/Terrorism training throughout New York State 
and to ensure that all training “deliverables” are evaluated for content, suitability, 
and duplication so as to ensure the highest level of preparedness for New York’s 
first responders” (New York State, n.d.a.). OHS serves as the point source for 
homeland security preparedness training in the City of New York (see Appendix 
F for the training calendar).  
C. NSI TRAINING ANALYSIS 
The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) and NSI 
developed a standardized training program for law enforcement officers on how 
to recognize behaviors associated with pre-incident terrorism activities and how 
to document suspicious activities. The training includes information on how to 
protect the privacy, civil rights and civil liberties of individuals. The training 
consists of a 15-minute video, NSI SAR Line Officer Training CD. The video can 
be viewed in-person or via a web link. After viewing the video, officers complete a 
form on the NSI website indicating completion of the training. A web-based 
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training video or CD is a good alternative for agencies that cannot send 
personnel to a training venue. The video can be shown to groups of officers 
during roll call, and therefore, minimizes the impact on organizations and staffing. 
This type of training delivery model fits well with smaller jurisdictions that 
lack the resources to send personnel to training. Also, smaller jurisdictions often 
lack the expertise in specialized fields, such as homeland security. Bringing a 
virtual homeland security expert into a department to train personnel and to 
accomplish the training at no cost is a good solution for the smaller law 
enforcement departments. 
Although larger law enforcement departments often staff many different 
specialized units, the suspicious activity training CD is also advantageous. Large 
groups of officers can receive the training in a short period of time. Again, a roll-
call environment would be a good venue to conduct the training.  
1. Analysis of SAR Intervention Success Stories 
The implementation and management of a SAR program requires 
departmental resources that include personnel and operational expenditures. 
With limited resources, the question remains if SAR programs result in actionable 
intelligence that justify the funding and personnel commitment by agencies. As 
stated earlier, a SAR program includes all criminal activity and is not confined to 
terrorism-related incidents. Police agencies have managed anonymous tip line 
programs for decades and these tip lines have resulted in the apprehension of 
criminals. SAR is an enhancement of the tip line format to include terrorism and 
homeland security. Two examples of SARs that aided in the criminal 
investigation or arrest of suspects are listed below. The examples were 
highlighted on the DHS website (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2011; 
Nationwide SAR Initiative (NSI), n.d.a.; Johnson & Wirtz, 2008).  
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a. Fusion Centers Provide Critical Information to Faisal 
Shahzad Case 
On May 1, 2010, Pakistani born Faisal Shahzad attempted to 
detonate a car bomb in Times Square, New York. He was eventually arrested on 
May 3 at the JFK International Airport as he attempted to fly to Dubai. Following 
the attempted bombing, the U.S. intelligence community began sharing tips and 
leads. 
During the investigation to find Shahzad, an AAA employee filed a 
suspicious activity report on May 2 with the New York State Intelligence Center. 
Shahzad called for AAA assistance because he locked his keys in his car. Police 
seized the car at the airport at the time of Shahzad’s arrest. A firearm was 
recovered in the car. The information aided the FBI in its investigation. 
The circumstances highlight the value of SAR programs. An alert 
citizen was able to access a SAR system and provide information critical to a 
terrorist bombing attempt. The intelligence center was able to retrieve the 
information and create intelligence that aided in the investigation. This example 
points to the principle that an informed citizenry is an important component in 
U.S. homeland security efforts. 
b. Fusion Center Supports Zazi Investigation—Colorado 
Information Analysis Center (CIAC), September 2009 
In September 2009, Afghan born Najibullah Zazi planned a suicide 
bombing at the New York City subway. After becoming suspicious that he was 
being investigated in New York, Zazi flew back to Denver, Colorado. He was 
arrested on September 19. 
During the investigation, the CIAC received suspicious activity 
reports through its website and 1-800 number. The information was shared with 
the DHS and the Denver FBI. The information aided in the investigation, which is 
a specific example of a report filed at a SAR website and a phone number. Two 
separate forms of submitting information were accessible to the public. Without a 
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specific mechanism for the public to report, important pieces of information may 
never be known and could jeopardize the safety of Americans. The two 
significant terrorist bombing plots could have had different outcomes had there 
not been SAR programs for the public to submit information. 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
SARs are extensions of the anonymous tip line programs that have been 
sponsored by police agencies for decades. SARs have developed over recent 
years in response to the post 9/11 homeland security strategy documents. The 
goal is to have an informed citizenry that can recognize suspicious activity 
related to terrorism and other crimes and report the information to stop terrorist 
activity. It is understood that terrorist activity can occur in any city in the United 
States, and it will take an educated and watchful citizenry to prevent acts.  
The 73 fusion centers in the United States have become the 
clearinghouse for much of the SAR activity. In addition, governmental agencies, 
such as DHS, FBI, NYPD, LAPD and many others, have adopted their own SAR 
programs into their operations. The larger federal agencies are tasked with 
terrorism prevention responsibilities, and therefore, staff SAR programs. Los 
Angeles and New York City are terrorist targets and have dedicated homeland 
security divisions including SAR programs. 
The research began with the fact that of the 21 law enforcement agencies 
in San Mateo County, California, one or 4.7% of the agencies support a SAR 
program. Thirteen of the 21 agencies support a population less than 35,000 and 
one agency supports a community of 101,000. The problem statement began 
with the statement that a gap appears to exist in SAR systems implemented by 
smaller law enforcement agencies and the gap can be a larger hole in the 
country’s overall homeland security. 
A website audit of the 355 California police agencies that contribute crime 
date to the DOJ UCR showed that only 21 police departments supported a SAR 
program (5.9%). The 355 agencies represent 77% of the total population of 
California, 29,270,474 of the 37,691,912. The population groupings from 10,000 
to 249,999 represented 342 of the 355 agencies and 64.5% of the population. 
Within these groupings, only 15 of the 342 agencies supported a SAR website 
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program. The 250,000 to 499,999 group had the highest rate of SAR with five of 
nine agencies or 55.5 percent. Neither of the two cites in the 500,000 to 999,999 
had an SAR program. 
A secondary audit was conducted and verified the results of the website 
audit. Of the 355 California agencies, 117 (33%) were contacted and three or 
2.6% provided a mechanism for the public to contact them directly to report 
suspicious activity related to terrorism.  
The problem statement is much larger that first believed. A complete lack 
of SAR programs by California law enforcement agencies occurred regardless of 
agency size and population served. The near absence of SAR programs may be 
a large hole for this country’s homeland security. California represents about 
12% of the nation’s population. The findings in California may be consistent with 
a much broader trend across all 50 states. Essentially, police departments in the 
United States have not adopted SAR programs. 
The research concluded that of the 355 agencies, only 67 or 18.8% 
displayed a link on their website to a state, federal or local fusion center site 
where a SAR could be accessed. The public lacks an online resource through its 
local police department’s websites to report suspicious activity related to 
terrorism or other criminal activity. 
The research also concluded that 144 or 40.5% of the agencies supported 
an anonymous tip line on their website. The public could report suspicious 
behavior through the tip line, but it is not specific to terrorism. However, the larger 
majority of California police departments do not support a tip line on their 
website.  
The research for this thesis has identified best practices to develop and 
implement a SAR program at police agencies in the country while meeting 
national standards and minimizing the organizational impacts. The 
recommendations assume that the law enforcement agency has made the 
decision to implement its own SAR program and will dedicate the resources to 
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act on information received through the SAR process in a timely manner. 
However, California police departments are not standing-up SAR programs. The 
gap in the literature exists at this juncture. 
The Nationwide SAR Initiative, National Homeland Security Strategy 
documents, the Fusion Center Privacy Policy Development document, the 
Findings and Recommendations of the Suspicious Activity Report document and 
the SAR Process Implementation Checklist document assume that law 
enforcement agencies have the resources to support a SAR program. With that 
assumption, the documents provide a comprehensive methodology to initiate a 
SAR program. The documents do not provide recommendations for agencies 
that do not have the resources to sustain a SAR program. An alternative to those 
agencies is not provided. The research showed that in California, only 5.9% of 
the audited police departments have SAR programs. The literature does not 
address the other 94.1% of the agencies that do not have a SAR program and 
does not provide an alternative for those agencies.  
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Adopt a National SAR Model 
The federal government through the DHS should adopt a centralized SAR 
system similar to the MPS of the United Kingdom and Israel. A comprehensive 
public awareness campaign would be a key component. Both the MPS and Israel 
have engaged in ongoing public education. The New York MTA, If you see 
something, say something, is an example of a model that may be appropriate. 
The Israel National Police is the point of contact for SAR and all tips are 
received at the “Dial 100” telephone number. The same number serves the entire 
country. The National Police forward all terrorism-related tips to the Israeli 
Security Authority. A single source of input for the entire United States might 
coordinate all terrorism-related tips and better serve the country’s homeland 
security.  
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Another recommendation is that the DHS decentralize the national SAR 
model to the 73 fusion centers throughout the United States. The fusion centers 
would further decentralize by relying on local law enforcement to forward SAR-
related information directly to the fusion center. Local law enforcement would 
partner with the fusion centers in the public awareness campaign and provide 
direct links on their websites to a fusion center SAR program. Law enforcement 
agencies that could manage their own SAR programs would not be prohibited. 
Since local law enforcement has not been able to adopt SAR programs, a system 
needs to be developed to allow the public a consistent venue to report suspicious 
activity. 
2. Require National SAR Training for Law Enforcement 
The NSI 15-minute SAR training video should be mandated for all law 
enforcement personnel. The video highlights how to recognize behaviors 
associated with pre-incident terrorism activities, how to document suspicious 
activities, and addresses civil liberties and privacy issues. The training video can 
also be viewed via the NSI website. The International Association of Chiefs of 
Police is currently involved in this endeavor. However, the training should be 
mandated. Agencies that do not comply could be subject to a loss of homeland 
security grant funding and could be a similar model to the training mandates 
required to receive federal reimbursements in the event of federal disaster 
support. 
B. FUTURE RESEARCH 
The research was confined to the state of California and resulted in the 
finding that an overall lack of SAR programs in California police departments 
exists. The findings were consistent among nearly all population groups and 
agencies size. Additional research should be conducted to determine if the 
California trend represents a broader national trend.  
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The research was an audit of 355 California police agency websites that 
represent 77% of the California population served by police departments. The 
research did not explore the factors why only 5.9% of the agencies support a 
SAR program. Additional research could include a survey of each of the agencies 
to determine other associated factors. For example, departments may be using 
other means to educate the public in suspicious activity and have adopted other 
types of reporting mechanisms. More importantly, the survey could inquire the 
reasons why departments are not supporting a SAR program. 
Through the IACP, future research on a national level should include a 
survey to address additional questions not asked by this body of research. If the 
national findings are consistent with the California trend, then the homeland 
security field will need to address the fact that 5% of law enforcement agencies 
have SAR programs and lack a local mechanism for the public to report 
suspicious activity. 
C. CLOSING 
Homeland security is a shared responsibility between the public, 
governmental agencies and the private sector. The best opportunity for the 
country to prevent a terrorist attack is from reported observed suspicious 
behavior by a member of U.S. citizenry. Missed opportunities have occurred as 
evident of 9/11 hijackers taking pilot lessons in San Diego and other parts of the 
country. Successful intervention has been seen as with the attempted bombing of 
New York’s Times Square by Faisal Shahzad. SAR programs provide a 
mechanism for the public to submit reports of observed suspicious criminal or 
terrorist activity to its local law enforcement agency.  
This research began from the perspective that SAR programs lacked in 
the smaller police departments and were more prevalent in larger sized police 
departments. However, the findings were surprisingly different. Based on this 
research, the state of California, and possibly the broader context of the United 
States, is not engaged in the SAR strategy as desired. Members of the public do 
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not have access to report suspicious activity related to terrorism directly to their 
law enforcement agency of jurisdiction. Police departments are not educating the 
public in the signs and behaviors of suspicious terrorism activity.  
Since terrorism can occur anywhere within U.S. borders, it is imperative 
that the American public recognize the signs of suspicious activity related to 
terrorism and know how and where to report the activity. Law enforcement at the 
local, state and federal level needs to be engaged in the SAR systems.  
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APPENDIX A. SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORT AUDIT 
Suspicious Activity Reporting Population: 10,000–24,999 
  



















1 Agoura Hills-LASD   X     X 20,330
2 Albany    X     X 18,539
3 American Canyon           19,454
4 Anderson           9,932
5 Arcata          X 17,231
6 Arroyo Grande         X 15,851
7 Artesia-LASD   X     X 16,380
8 Arvin            12,956
9 Auburn   X       13,352
10 Avenal-Kings Cty SD           15,505
11 Barstow   X X     22,639
12 Belmont         X 25,835
13 Blythe           20,817
14 Brawley           24,953
15 Calabasas         X 23,058
16 California City             
17 Canyon Lake-RSD           11,212
18 Carpinteria-SBSD   X     X 14,194
19 Chowchilla     X   X 13,077
20 Clayton           11,431
21 Clearlake-Lake Cty SD           15,250
22 Coalinga-LASD   X       11,668
23 Commerce   X     X 12,568
24 Corcoran           24,813
25 Cudahy           23,805
26 Desert Hot Springs   X     X 25,938
27 Dinuba           21,453
28 Duarte           21,321
29 El Cerrito   X     X 23,549
30 El Segundo   X     X 16,182
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Suspicious Activity Reporting Population: 10,000–24,999 
  



















31 Exeter           9,973
32 Farmersville           10,078
33 Fillmore-VCSD         X 15,220
34 Fortuna   X X     11,355
35 Galt   X       23,647
36 Grand Terrace-SBSD           12,040
37 Grass Valley     X     12,298
38 Greenfield   X       19,367
39 Grover Beach           13,200
40 Half Moon Bay-SMCSO X X     X 12,586
41 
Hawaiian Gardens-
LASD   X     X 15,186
42 Healdsburg         X 11,143
43 Hermosa Beach     X   X 19,506
44 Hillborough         X 10,825
45 Imperial           13,878
46 Kerman           14,500
47 King City           11,660
48 Kingsburg         X 11,257
49 La Canada Flintridge   X     X 20,246
50 La Palma           15,719
51 Laguna Beach         X 22,723
52 Laguna Woods-OCSD     X X   18,234
53 Lemon Grove-SDSD   X X X X 25,320
54 Lemoore   X X   X 24,531
55 Lindsay           10,700
56 Livingston     X     13,368
57 Loma Linda - SBSD X X X     23,261
58 Lomita - LASD   X     X 20,256
59 Los Alamitos     X X   11,693
60 Malibu   X     X 13,042
61 Marina    X     X 25,041
62 Marysville           11,622
63 Mill Valley         X 13,404
 51
Suspicious Activity Reporting Population: 10,000–24,999 
  



















64 Millbrae         X 21,532
65 Moraga           16,016
66 Morro Bay           10,391
67 Newman   X X     10,182
68 Oakdale   X       20,675
69 Orinda         X 18,686
70 Oroville           14,660
71 Pacific Grove           14,637
72 Palos Verdes Estates           13,546
73 Parlier           13,331
74 Patterson-SCSD   X       20,413
75 Piedmont           10,572
76 Pinole         X 18,939
77 Placerville           10,095
78 Port Hueneme           21,555
79 Rancho Mirage           16,800
80 Red Bluff     X     13,795
81 Reedley           24,194
82 Ripon X   X     14,738
83 Riverbank-SCSD   X       20,684
84 San Anselmo         X 12,058
85 San Fernando           23,645
86 San Marino           12,758
87 Sanger           24,270
88 Santa Fe Springs           16,263
89 Scotts Valley           11,266
90 Seal Beach         X 24,168
91 Selma     X     23,219
92 Shafter            15,911
93 Sierra Madre         X 10,786
94 Signal Hill   X       10,834
95 Solana Beach-SDSD   X X X X 13,059
96 South El Monte-LASD   X     X 21,672
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Suspicious Activity Reporting Population: 10,000–24,999 
  



















97 South Lake Tahoe           21,403
98 South Pasadena   X X     25,619
99 Susanville           14,044
100 Truckee           16,260
101 Twin Cities           23,000
102 Ukiah           14,857
103 Yucca Valley X X X     20,700
 
Suspicious Activity Reporting Population: 50,000–99,999 
  



















1 Alameda           75,409
2 Alhambra         X 87,299
3 Apple Valley-SBSD X X X   X 70,109
4 Arcadia   X     X 56,202
5 Baldwin Park         X 77,078
6 Bellflower-LASD   X     X 72,862
7 Brentwood           49,708
8 Buena Park     X   X 82,768
9 Camarillo-VCSD   X X   X 63,948
10 Carlsbad         X 98,402
11 Carson-LASD   X     X 92,255
12 Cathedral City           52,436
13 Cerritos-LASD   X     X 51,113
14 Chico           64,015
15 Chino Hills-SBSD X X X   X 73,889
16 Chino         X 82,830
17 City of Murieta   X     X 58,392
18 Clovis     X     93,246
19 Colton   X       50,495
20 Compton-LASD   X     X 93,970
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21 Cupertino-SCCSO   X X     54,278
22 Davis         X 62,947
23 Delano           52,802
24 Diamond Bar-LASD   X     X 57,105
25 El Cajon   X     X 94,447
26 Encinitas-SDSD   X X X X 61,593
27 Folsom   X X   X 67,807
28 Fountain Valley         X 55,844
29 Gardena   X       58,363
30 Glendora   X       49,737
31 Hawthorne         X 83,945
32 Hemet     X     71,801
33 Hesperia   X     X 86,194
34 Highland-SBSD X X X   X 51,002
35 Huntington Park           60,641
36 Indio   X     X 85,067
37 La Habra   X       59,410
38 La Mirada-LASD   X     X 49,752
39 Laguena Niguel-OCSD     X   X 64,812
40 Lake Forest-OCSD     X   X 60,793
41 Lakewood-LASD   X     X 78,097
42 Lamesa     X   X 55,547
43 Livermore X       X 88,000
44 Lodi         X 61,450
45 Lynwood-LASD   X     X 69,755
46 Madera         X 56,692
47 Manteca   X       65,631
48 Merced   X     X 76,274
49 Milpitas   X     X 67,895
50 Mission Viejo-OCSD     X   X 94,651
51 Montebello           61,676
52 Monterey Park           61,571
53 Mountain view         X 72,222
54 Napa   X     X 75,279
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55 National City         X 56,123
56 Newport Beach   X X   X 72,521
57 Novato   X     X 53,449
58 Palo Alto         X 60,171
59 Paramount-LASD   X     X 55,018
60 Perris   X     X 56,118
61 Petaluma         X 55,178
62 Pico Rivera-LASD   X     X 62,895
63 Pittsburg         X 65,129
64 Placentia     X   X 49,938
65 Pleasanton   X     X 68,755
66 
Rancho Santa 
Margarita -OCSD     X   X 49,458
67 Redding     X     90,521
68 Redlands   X     X 69,976
69 Redondo Beach         X 66,711
70 Redwood City     X   X 74,508
71 Rocklin   X     X 53,572
72 Rosemead-LASD   X     X 54,272
73 San Clemente-OCSD     X   X 61,610
74 San Leandro   X     X 81,466
75 San Mateo         X 92,791
76 San Rafael   X     X 55,901
77 San Ramon         X 49,548
78 Santa Barbara   X     X 86,353
79 Santa Cruz   X       56,810
80 Santa Maria           86,931
81 Santa Monica         X 87,563
82 Santee-SDSD   X X X X 55,341
83 South Gate           96,285
84 South San Francisco   X     X 62,830
85 Temecula           76,107
86 Tracy     X   X 79,235
87 Tulare           57,521
88 Turlock   X     X 68,712
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89 Tustin         X 72,539
90 Union City   X       73,402
91 Upland       X   72,974
92 Vacaville   X       91,991
93 Walnut Creek   X     X 64,008
94 Westminster X X X   X 89,547
95 Whittier   X     X 81,877
96 Woodland         X 55,270
97 Yorba Linda-Brea PD   X       66,120
98 Yuba City     X   X 42,492
99 Yucaipa X X X   X 50,022
 
Suspicious Activity Reporting: 100,000–249,999 
  



















1 Antioch         x 102,232
2 Berkeley           112,580
3 Burbank         x 103,340
4 Chula Vista         x 243,916
5 Concord         x 122,067
6 Corona         x 151,037
7 Costa Mesa         x 109,960
8 Daly City   x     x 101,123
9 Downey   x     x 111,772
10 El Monte           113,475
11 Escondido   x     x 143,911
12 Fairfield         x 108,321
13 Fontana         x 196,069
14 Fremont         x 214,089
15 Fullerton         x 135,161
16 Garden Grove       x x 170,883
17 Glendale   x     x 191,719
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18 Hayward         x 144,186
19 Huntington Beach           189,992
20 Inglewood   x     x 109,673
21 Irvine         x 212,375
22 Lancaster x x     x 156,633
23 Modesto   x     x 201,165
24 Moreno Valley         x 186,365
25 Norwalk           105,549
26 Oceanside         x 183,095
27 Ontario         x 163,924
28 Orange   x       136,416
29 Oxnard         x 197,899
30 Palmdale   x     x 152,750
31 Pasadena   x       137,122
32 Pomona   x     x 149,058
33 Rancho Cucamonga   x     x 165,269
34 Rialto   x     x 100,000
35 Richmond         x 102,000
36 Roseville   x     x 118,788
37 Salinas   x     x 150,441
38 San Bernardino   x       209,924
39 Santa Clara     x   x 116,468
40 Santa Clarita   x     x 176,320
41 Santa Rosa           167,815
42 Simi Valley         x 124,237
43 Sunnyvale         x 140,081
44 Thousand Oaks         x 126,683
45 Torrance         x 145,438
46 Vallejo           115,942
47 Ventura         x 106,433
48 Victorville           115,903
49 Visalia   x     x 124,442
50 West Covina   x       106,098
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1 Anaheim x x   x x 365,463
2 Bakersfield x x x x x 347,483
3 Fresno x x     x 510,365
4 Long Beach x x     x 462,257
5 Oakland         x 390,724
6 Riverside           303,871
7 Sacramento x x x x x 466,488
8 Santa Ana           324,528
9 Stockton         x 291,707
 
Suspicious Activity Reporting Population: 500,000–999,999 
  



















1 San Francisco   x     x 805,235
2 San Jose   x     x 945,942
 
Suspicious Activity Reporting Population: One Million + 
  



















1 Los Angeles X X X X X 3,792,621
2 San Diego         X 1,301,607
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Means of Reporting 
American Canyon     
Arroyo Grande     
Auburn     
Belmont     
Calabasas     
Carpinteria     
Clearlake     
Corcoran     
Dinuba     
El Segundo     
Fillmore     
Grand Terrace     
Grover Beach     
Healdsburg     
Imperial     
Kingsburg     
Laguna Beach     
Lemoore     
Loma Linda     
Malibu     
Mill Valley     
Morro Bay     
Orinda     
Palos Verdes Estates     
Piedmont     
Port Hueneme     
Reedley     
San Anselmo     
Sanger     
Seal Beach     
Sierra Madre     
South El Monte     
Susanville     







Means of Reporting 
Atascadero     
Banning     
Bell Gardens     
Brea X   
Campbell     
Coachella     
Culver City     
Danville     
El Centro     
Gilroy     
Hercules     
Lake Elsinore     
La Verne     
Lompoc     
Los Gatos     
Maywood     
Montclair     
Morgan Hill     
Oakley     
Palm Springs Pleasant 
Hill     
Rancho Palos Verdes     
Rohnert park     
San Dimas     
San Juan Capistrano     
Santa Paula     
Soledad     
Temple City     
Watsonville     






Means of Reporting 
Apple Valley     
Bellflower     
Camarillo     






Means of Reporting 
Chino Hills     
Clovis     
Cupertino     
Diamond Bar     
Folsom     
Glendora     
Hesperia     
Indio     
Laguena Nigel     
Lamesa     
Lynwood     
Merced     
Montebello     
Napa     
Novato     
Perris     
Pittsburg     
Rancho Santa Margarita     
Redondo Beach     
Rosemead     
San Mateo     
Santa Barbara     
Santa Monica     
South San Francisco     
Tulare     
Union City     
Walnut Creek     
Woddland     






Means of Reporting 
Burbank     
Corona     
Downey X   
Fairfield     
Fullerton     






Means of Reporting 
Irvine     
Moreno Valley     
Ontario     
Palmdale     
Rancho Cucamonga     
Roseville     
Santa Clara     
Simi Valley     
Torrance     






Means of Reporting 
Fresno     
Riverside     






Means of Reporting 






Means of Reporting 
San Diego     
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APPENDIX C. FUSION CENTER LOCATIONS 
A. PRIMARY FUSION CENTERS 
a. Alabama Fusion Center 
b. Alaska Information and Analysis Center 
c. Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center 
d. Arkansas State Fusion Center 
e. California State Threat Assessment Center 
f. Colorado Information Analysis Center 
g. Connecticut Intelligence Center 
h. Delaware Information Analysis Center 
i. Florida Fusion Center 
j. Georgia Information Sharing and Analysis Center 
k. Hawaii Pacific Regional Information Clearinghouse 
l. Idaho Criminal Intelligence Center 
m. Illinois Statewide Terrorism and Intelligence Center 
n. Indiana Intelligence Fusion Center 
o. Iowa Intelligence Fusion Center 
p. Kansas Intelligence Fusion Center 
q. Kentucky Intelligence Fusion Center 
r. Louisiana State Analytical & Fusion Exchange 
s. Maine Information and Analysis Center 
t. Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center 
u. Massachusetts Commonwealth Fusion Center 
v. Michigan Intelligence Operations Center 
w. Minnesota Joint Analysis Center 
x. Mississippi Analysis and Information Center 
y. Missouri Information Analysis Center 
z. Montana All-Threat Intelligence Center 
aa. Nebraska Information Analysis Center 
bb. New Hampshire Information and Analysis Center 
cc. New Jersey Regional Operations Intelligence Center 
dd. New Mexico All Source Intelligence Center 
ee. New York State Intelligence Center 
ff. North Carolina Information Sharing and Analysis Center 
gg. North Dakota State and Local Intelligence Center 
hh. Ohio Strategic Analysis and Information Center 
ii. Oklahoma Information Fusion Center 
jj. Oregon Terrorist Information Threat Assessment Network 
kk. Pennsylvania Criminal Intelligence Center 
ll. Puerto Rico National Security State Information Center 
mm. Rhode Island Fusion Center 
nn. South Carolina Information and Intelligence Center 
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oo. South Dakota Fusion Center 
pp. Southern Nevada Counter-Terrorism Center (Las Vegas, Nevada) 
qq. Tennessee Fusion Center 
rr. Texas Fusion Center 
ss. Utah Statewide Information and Analysis Center 
tt. Vermont Fusion Center 
uu. Virginia Fusion Center 
vv. Washington Regional Threat and Analysis Center (Washington, D.C.) 
ww. Washington State Fusion Center 
xx. West Virginia Intelligence Fusion Center 
yy. Wisconsin Statewide Information Center 
zz. Wyoming Fusion Center 
B. RECOGNIZED FUSION CENTERS 
a. Boston Regional Intelligence Center; Boston, MA 
b. Central California Intelligence Center; Sacramento, CA 
c. Central Florida Intelligence Exchange; Orlando, FL 
d. Chicago Crime Prevention and Information Center; Chicago, IL 
e. Cincinnati/Hamilton County Regional Terrorism Early Warning Group; 
Cincinnati, OH 
f. Delaware Valley Intelligence Center; Philadelphia, PA 
g. Detroit and Southeast Michigan Information and Intelligence Center; 
Detroit, MI 
h. Houston Regional Intelligence Service Center; Houston, TX 
i. Kansas City Regional Terrorism Early Warning Interagency Analysis 
Center; Kansas City, MO 
j. Los Angeles Joint Regional Intelligence Center; Los Angeles, CA 
k. Nevada Threat Analysis Center; Carson City, NV 
l. North Central Texas Fusion Center; McKinney, TX 
m. Northeast Ohio Regional Fusion Center; Cleveland, OH 
n. Northern California Regional Intelligence Center; San Francisco, CA 
o. Northern Virginia Regional Intelligence Center; Fairfax, VA 
p. Orange County Intelligence Assessment Center; Orange County, CA 
q. San Diego Law Enforcement Coordination Center; San Diego, CA 
r. Southeast Florida Fusion Center; Miami, FL 
s. Southeastern Wisconsin Threat Analysis Center; Milwaukee, WI 
t. Southwestern PA Region 13 Fusion Center, Pittsburgh, PA 
u. St. Louis Terrorism Early Warning Group; St. Louis, MO 
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APPENDIX D. FUSION CENTER TRAINING MASTER CALENDAR 
Tallahassee, Florida - Foundations of Intelligence Analysis Training (FIAT) AWR-
204 
1. Monday, January 10, 2011 to Friday, January 14, 2011 
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst 
3. Phone: 877-628-7674 
 
San Antonio, Texas - Advanced Criminal Intelligence Analysis to Prevent 
Terrorism AWR-158 
1. Monday, January 10, 2011 to Friday, January 14, 2011 
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst 
3. Phone: 877-628-7674 
 
Ewing, New Jersey - Foundations of Intelligence Analysis Training (FIAT) AWR-
204 
1. Monday, January 10, 2011 to Friday, January 14, 2011 
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst 
3. Phone: 877-628-7674 
 
Colorado - SAR Analytic Role Training 
1. Wednesday, January 19, 2011 to Wednesday, January 19, 2011 
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst 
3. Contact: Denise Reeder 
4. Phone: (850) 385-0600 
 
Georgia - Criminal Intelligence Sharing: Protecting Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil 
Liberties 
1. Wednesday, January 26, 2011 to Wednesday, January 26, 2011 
2. Training Category: Criminal Intelligence Officer 
3. Contact: Stephanie Roeser 
4. Phone: (850) 385-0600 
 
Florida - SAR Analytic Role Training 
1. Thursday, January 27, 2011 to Thursday, January 27, 2011 
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst 
3. Contact: Denise Reeder 
4. Phone: (850) 385-0600 
 
Louisiana - SAR Analytic Role Training 
1. Monday, January 31, 2011 to Monday, January 31, 2011 
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst 
3. Contact: Denise Reeder 
4. Phone: (850) 385-0600 
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Nashville, Tennessee - Financial Records Examination & Analysis (FREA) 
1. Monday, January 31, 2011 to Friday, February 04, 2011 
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst 
3. Phone: 877-628-7674 
 
Jefferson City, Missouri - Foundations of Intelligence Analysis Training (FIAT) 
AWR-204 
1. Monday, January 31, 2011 to Friday, February 04, 2011 
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst 
3. Phone: 877-628-7674 
 
Mississippi - SAR Analytic Role Training 
1. Wednesday, February 02, 2011 to Wednesday, February 02, 2011 
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst 
3. Contact: Denise Reeder 
4. Phone: (850) 385-0600 
 
Fairmont, West Virginia - Analyst's Notebook V8 Level One 
1. Monday, February 07, 2011 to Friday, February 11, 2011 
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst 
3. Phone: 877-628-7674 
 
Las Vegas, Nevada - Foundations of Intelligence Analysis Training (FIAT) AWR-
204 
1. Monday, February 07, 2011 to Friday, February 11, 2011 
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst 
3. Phone: 877-628-7674 
 
Ventura, California - Analyst's Notebook V8 Level One 
1. Monday, February 14, 2011 to Friday, February 18, 2011 
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst 
3. Phone: 877-628-7674 
 
Illinois - Criminal Intelligence Systems Operating Polices (28 CFR Part 23) 
Training 
1. Tuesday, February 15, 2011 to Tuesday, February 15, 2011 
2. Training Category: Criminal Intelligence Officer 
3. Contact: Stephanie Roeser 








Illinois - Criminal Intelligence Systems Operating Polices (28 CFR Part 23) 
Training 
1. Wednesday, February 16, 2011 to Wednesday, February 16, 2011 
2. Training Category: Criminal Intelligence Officer 
3. Contact: Stephanie Roeser 
4. Phone: (850) 385-0600 
 
Nevada - Intelligence Commanders Course 
1. Wednesday, February 16, 2011 to Thursday, February 17, 2011 
2. Training Category: Intelligence Manager/Commander 
3. Contact: Jennifer Turner 
4. Phone: (850) 385-0600 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana - Foundations of Intelligence Analysis Training (FIAT) AWR-
204 
1. Monday, February 28, 2011 to Friday, March 04, 2011 
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst 
3. Phone: 877-628-7674 
 
California - SAR Analytic Role Training 
1. Tuesday, March 01, 2011 to Tuesday, March 01, 2011 
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst 
3. Contact: Denise Reeder 
4. Phone: 850 385 0600 
 
California - SAR Analytic Role Training 
1. Thursday, March 03, 2011 to Thursday, March 03, 2011 
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst 
3. Contact: Denise Reeder 
4. Phone: 850 385 0600 
 
Columbus, Ohio - Advanced Criminal Intelligence Analysis to Prevent Terrorism 
AWR-158 
1. Monday, March 07, 2011 to Friday, March 11, 2011 
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst 
3. Phone: 877-628-7674 
 
Houston, Texas - Financial Records Examination & Analysis (FREA) 
1. Monday, March 14, 2011 to Friday, March 18, 2011 
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst 






Lincoln, Nebraska - Analyst's Notebook V8 Level One 
1. Monday, March 21, 2011 to Friday, March 25, 2011 
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst 
3. Phone: 877-628-7674 
 
Woodlawn, Maryland - Foundations of Intelligence Analysis Training (FIAT) 
AWR-204 
1. Monday, March 21, 2011 to Friday, March 25, 2011 
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst 
3. Phone: 877-628-7674 
 
Michigan - SAR Analytic Role Training 
1. Thursday, March 31, 2011 to Thursday, March 31, 2011 
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst 
3. Contact: Denise Reeder 
4. Phone: 850 385 0600 
 
Oriskany, New York - Advanced Criminal Intelligence Analysis to Prevent 
Terrorism AWR-158 
1. Monday, April 04, 2011 to Friday, April 08, 2011 
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst 
3. Phone: 877-628-7674 
 
Utah - SAR Analytic Role Training 
1. Tuesday, April 05, 2011 to Tuesday, April 05, 2011 
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst 
3. Contact: Denise Reeder 
4. Phone: 850 385 0600 
 
Scotch Plains, New Jersey - Analyst's Notebook V8 Level One 
1. Monday, April 11, 2011 to Friday, April 15, 2011 
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst 
3. Phone: 877-628-7674 
 
Pennsylvania - SAR Analytic Role Training 
1. Tuesday, April 12, 2011 to Tuesday, April 12, 2011 
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst 
3. Contact: Denise Reeder 








Missouri - Criminal Intelligence Sharing: Protecting Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil 
Liberties 
1. Tuesday, April 12, 2011 to Tuesday, April 12, 2011 
2. Training Category: Criminal Intelligence Officer 
3. Contact: Stephanie Roeser 
4. Phone: (850) 385-0600 
 
Virginia - Criminal Intelligence Sharing: Protecting Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil 
Liberties 
1. Thursday, April 14, 2011 to Thursday, April 14, 2011 
2. Training Category: Criminal Intelligence Officer 
3. Contact: Stephanie Roeser 
4. Phone: (850) 385-0600 
 
Massachusetts - SAR Analytic Role Training 
1. Thursday, April 14, 2011 to Thursday, April 14, 2011 
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst 
3. Contact: Denise Reeder 
4. Phone: 850 385 0600 
 
Wichita, Kansas - Foundations of Intelligence Analysis Training (FIAT) AWR-204 
1. Monday, April 18, 2011 to Friday, April 22, 2011 
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst 
3. Phone: 877-628-7674 
 
Amarillo, Texas - Introduction to Law Enforcement Intelligence 
1. Monday, April 18, 2011 to Tuesday, April 19, 2011 
2. Training Category: General Law Enforcement Officer – Basic 
Criminal Intelligence 
3. Contact: Ken Sanz 
4. Phone: 727.639.1263 
 
Alabama - SAR Analytic Role Training 
1. Thursday, April 21, 2011 to Thursday, April 21, 2011 
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst 
3. Contact: Denise Reeder 
4. Phone: 850 385 0600 
 
Scotch Plains, New Jersey - Financial Records Examination & Analysis (FREA) 
1. Monday, April 25, 2011 to Friday, April 29, 2011 
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst 





Texas - Criminal Intelligence Sharing: Protecting Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil 
Liberties 
1. Tuesday, April 26, 2011 to Tuesday, April 26, 2011 
2. Training Category: Criminal Intelligence Officer 
3. Contact: Stephanie Roeser 
4. Phone: (850) 385-0600 
 
Alaska - SAR Analytic Role Training 
1. Wednesday, April 27, 2011 to Wednesday, April 27, 2011 
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst 
3. Contact: Denise Reeder 
4. Phone: 850 385 0600 
 
Fairmont, West Virginia - Foundations of Intelligence Analysis Training (FIAT) 
AWR-204 
1. Monday, May 02, 2011 to Friday, May 06, 2011 
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst 
3. Phone: 877-628-7674 
 
Nashville, Tennessee - LEIU/IALEIA Annual Training Conference 
1. Monday, May 02, 2011 to Friday, May 06, 2011 
2. Training Category: Topic-Specific Intelligence Training 
3. Contact: Bob Morehouse 
4. Phone: (916) 704-4949 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana - Advanced Criminal Intelligence Analysis to Prevent 
Terrorism AWR-158 
1. Monday, May 09, 2011 to Friday, May 13, 2011 
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst 
3. Phone: 877-628-7674 
 
Lansing, Michigan - Foundations of Intelligence Analysis Training (FIAT) AWR-
204 
1. Monday, May 23, 2011 to Friday, May 27, 2011 
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst 
3. Phone: 877-628-7674 
 
Helena, Montana - Financial Records Examination & Analysis (FREA) 
1. Monday, May 23, 2011 to Friday, May 27, 2011 
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst 






North Carolina - Criminal Intelligence Sharing: Protecting Privacy, Civil Rights, 
and Civil Liberties 
1. Monday, May 23, 2011 to Monday, May 23, 2011 
2. Training Category: Criminal Intelligence Officer 
3. Contact: Stephanie Roeser 
4. Phone: (850) 385-0600 
 
Oregon - SAR Analytic Role Training 
1. Thursday, May 26, 2011 to Thursday, May 26, 2011 
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst 
3. Contact: Denise Reeder 
4. Phone: 850 385 0600 
 
Texas - Criminal Intelligence Sharing: Protecting Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil 
Liberties 
1. Wednesday, June 01, 2011 to Wednesday, June 01, 2011 
2. Training Category: Criminal Intelligence Officer 
3. Contact: Stephanie Roeser 
4. Phone: (850) 385-0600 
 
New York, New York - Analyst's Notebook V8 Level One 
1. Monday, June 06, 2011 to Friday, June 10, 2011 
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst 
3. Phone: 877-628-7674 
 
Missouri - SAR Analytic Role Training 
1. Wednesday, June 08, 2011 to Wednesday, June 08, 2011 
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst 
3. Contact: Denise Reeder 
4. Phone: 850 385 0600 
 
Missouri - SAR Analytic Role Training 
1. Thursday, June 09, 2011 to Thursday, June 09, 2011 
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst 
3. Contact: Denise Reeder 
4. Phone: 850 385 0600 
 
Waunakee, Wisconsin - Financial Records Examination & Analysis (FREA) 
1. Monday, June 13, 2011 to Friday, June 17, 2011 
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst 






Texas - Intelligence Commanders Course 
1. Tuesday, June 14, 2011 to Wednesday, June 15, 2011 
2. Training Category: Intelligence Manager/Commander 
3. Contact: Jennifer Turner 
4. Phone: (850) 385-0600 
 
Lakewood, Colorado - Advanced Criminal Intelligence Analysis to Prevent 
Terrorism AWR-158 
1. Monday, June 20, 2011 to Friday, June 24, 2011 
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst 
3. Phone: 877-628-7674 
 
Iowa - SAR Analytic Role Training 
1. Thursday, June 23, 2011 to Thursday, June 23, 2011 
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst 
3. Contact: Denise Reeder 
4. Phone: 850 385 0600 
 
Columbus, Ohio - Foundations of Intelligence Analysis Training (FIAT) AWR-204 
1. Monday, June 27, 2011 to Friday, July 01, 2011 
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst 
3. Phone: 877-628-7674 
 
Woodlawn, Maryland - Analyst's Notebook V8 Level One 
1. Monday, June 27, 2011 to Friday, July 01, 2011 
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst 
3. Phone: 877-628-7674 
 
Florida - Criminal Intelligence Sharing: Protecting Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil 
Liberties 
1. Wednesday, June 29, 2011 to Wednesday, June 29, 2011 
2. Training Category: Criminal Intelligence Officer 
3. Contact: Stephanie Roeser 
4. Phone: (850) 385-0600 
 
San Marcos, TX, Texas - Introduction to Law Enforcement Intelligence 
1. Tuesday, July 12, 2011 to Thursday, July 14, 2011 
2. Training Category: General Law Enforcement Officer – Basic 
Criminal Intelligence 
3. Contact: REGISTRAR 






Missouri - SAR Analytic Role Training 
1. Thursday, July 14, 2011 to Thursday, July 14, 2011 
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst 
3. Contact: Denise Reeder 
4. Phone: 850 385 0600 
 
McAllen, TX, Texas - Introduction to Law Enforcement Intelligence 
1. Tuesday, July 19, 2011 to Wednesday, July 20, 2011 
2. Training Category: General Law Enforcement Officer – Basic 
Criminal Intelligence 
3. Contact: Shane Bonnet 
4. Phone: 210 452-0135 
 
Amarillo, TX, Texas - Introduction to Law Enforcement Intelligence 
1. Tuesday, August 02, 2011 to Thursday, August 04, 2011 
2. Training Category: General Law Enforcement Officer – Basic 
Criminal Intelligence 
3. Contact: REGISTRAR 
4. Phone: 1-800-803-6532 
 
Houston, Texas - Introduction to Law Enforcement Intelligence 
1. Tuesday, August 09, 2011 to Thursday, August 11, 2011 
2. Training Category: General Law Enforcement Officer – Basic 
Criminal Intelligence 
3. Contact: Susan Krueger 
4. Phone: (281) 372-5857 
 
Georgia - Criminal Intelligence Sharing: Protecting Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil 
Liberties 
1. Wednesday, August 17, 2011 to Wednesday, August 17, 2011 
2. Training Category: Criminal Intelligence Officer 
3. Contact: Stephanie Roeser 
4. Phone: (850) 385-0600 
 
Des Moines, Iowa, - Introduction to Law Enforcement Intelligence 
1. Wednesday, September 07, 2011 to Friday, September 09, 2011 
2. Training Category: General Law Enforcement Officer – Basic 
Criminal Intelligence 
3. Contact: registrar 







Tennessee - Criminal Intelligence Sharing: Protecting Privacy, Civil Rights, and 
Civil Liberties 
1. Thursday, September 08, 2011 to Thursday, September 08, 2011 
2. Training Category: Criminal Intelligence Officer 
3. Contact: Stephanie Roeser 
4. Phone: (850) 385-0600 
 
Des Moines, Iowa, - Intelligence - Connecting the Dots 
1. Monday, September 19, 2011 to Friday, September 23, 2011 
2. Training Category: Topic-Specific Intelligence Training 
3. Contact: Registrar 
4. Phone: 800-803-6532 
 
California - Criminal Intelligence Sharing: Protecting Privacy, Civil Rights, and 
Civil Liberties 
1. Tuesday, September 20, 2011 to Tuesday, September 20, 2011 
2. Training Category: Criminal Intelligence Officer 
3. Contact: Stephanie Roeser 
4. Phone: (850) 385-0600 
 
Lansing, Michigan - Advanced Criminal Intelligence Analysis to Prevent 
Terrorism AWR-158 
1. Monday, October 24, 2011 to Friday, October 28, 2011 
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst 
3. Phone: 877-628-7674 
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APPENDIX E. NCRIC TRAINING CALENDAR  
June 2012 July 2012 August 2012 September 2012















San Francisco, CA 
 
 
June 28-29, 2012; 






June 29, 2012 - 
Friday 


































































June 2012 July 2012 August 2012 September 2012














July 18-19, 2012; 
Wednesday - 
Thursday 





July 19, 2012 - 
Thursday 
TLO Basic Course
San Mateo, CA 






Table 12.   NCRIC TRAINING CALENDAR (From: Northern California 
Regional Intelligence Center and Northern California High Intensity 
Drug Trafficking Area, n.d.) 
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APPENDIX F. NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF HOMELAND 
SECURITY TRAINING CALENDAR 
June 2012 
Date /Time Course Title Location 
June 11 - 12, 
2012  





Medical Preparedness and 




June 11, 2012 




NYS Emergency Operations 
Center Course Albany, NY  
June 12, 2012 




Disaster-Lan for EOC 
Personnel 8.0.4 Albany, NY  
June 12 - 13, 
2012  
8:00 am - 5:00 
pm 
PER - 275  
  
Law Enforcement Active 
Shooter Emergency Response  
*** Lodging Available *** 
Oriskany, 
NY  
June 12, 2012 
8:00 am - 4:30 
pm 




"How to Hunt" Criminals and 
Terrorists: The Actionable 
Intelligence Workshop 
Albany, NY  
June 12-13, 2012  




ICS For Major and/or Complex 
Incidents  
***Course Full *** 
Hornell, NY  
June 13, 2012 
8:00 am - 4:30 
pm 
  Counter Surveillance for Law Enforcement & Analysts Albany, NY  
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Date /Time Course Title Location 
June 19, 2012  








June 19 - 21, 
2012  




Intermediate ICS for Expanding 
Incidents Fulton, NY  
June 20 - 21, 
2012  




Executive Seminar: Prevention 
of, Response to, and Recovery 
From Campus Emergencies 
Albany, NY  
June 26 - 27, 
2012  




ICS For Major and/or Complex 
Incidents Ithaca, NY  
June 26 -28, 
2012  




Intermediate ICS for Expanding 
Incidents 
***Course Closed *** 
Syosset, NY 
June 26 - 27, 
2012  
8:00 am - 5:00 
pm 
PER - 275  
  
Law Enforcement Active 
Shooter Emergency Response  
*** Lodging Available *** 
Oriskany, 
NY  
June 26, 2012 




Risk and Vulnerability 
Assessments for Rural 
Communities 
Alexandria 
Bay, NY  
July 2012 
Date /Time Course Title Location 
July 6, 2012 





Law Enforcement Active 






Date /Time Course Title Location 
July 9 - 12, 2012  
8:00 am - 5:00 
pm  
July 13, 2012  




Blast School  
  
Large Vehicle Bomb Post Blast 
School  
*** Lodging Available *** 
Fort Drum, 
NY  
July 10-11, 2012 




Law Enforcement Active 
Shooter Emergency Response 
*** Lodging Available *** 
Oriskany, 
NY  
July 11, 2012 ADVANCED HURREVAC  




July 11, 2012 




NYS Emergency Operations 
Center Course Albany, NY  
July 12, 2012 
8:30 am - 3:30 
pm 
D-LAN 8.0.4  
  
Disaster-LAN for EOC 
Personnel 8.0.4 Albany, NY  
















July 13, 2012 









July 18, 2012 




Rail Car Incident Response 
Course 
*** Lodging Available *** 
Oriskany, 
NY  
July 24-26, 2012 




Wide Area Search and Rescue 
*** Lodging Available *** 
Oriskany, 
NY  
July 24, 2012 




Law Enforcement Active 




Date /Time Course Title Location 
July 25, 8:00 am - 
5:00 pm 
July 26, 8:00 am - 
12:00 pm 
*** Lodging Available *** 
July 25, 2012 




WMD Awareness Training 
*** Lodging Available *** 
Oriskany, 
NY  
July 30 - August 
1, 2012 




Intermediate ICS for Expanding 
Incidents Goshen, NY 
July 31, 2012 - 
August 2, 2012 
SD-LES  
  
Surveillance Detection for Law 





Date /Time Course Title Location 
August 2-3, 2012 




ICS For Major and/or Complex 
Incidents Goshen, NY 
August 13, 15, 
20, 22, 27, 29, 
2012  
6:00 pm - 10:00 
pm All Nights 
I-300  
  
Intermediate ICS for Expanding 
Incidents 
Clarence 
Center, NY  
August 22, 2012 




Disaster-Lan for EOC 
Personnel 8.0.4 Lockport, NY 
Table 13.   New York State Office of Homeland Security Training Calendar 
(From: New York State, n.d.b.) 
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